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Ethical: 2. Professionally right or befitting; conforming to professional 
standards of conduct. I 
Tragedy: a word of uncertain derivation, applied, broadly, to dramatic 
(or, by extension, other) works in which events move to a fatal or 
disastrous conclusion.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Supreme Court's opinion in Batson v. Kentucky,3 the rules 
and tools available to lawyers for selecting juries have changed dramati-
cally from what they had been for decades in American courtrooms.4 
The Court's well intentioned effort in Batson to attempt to eliminate 
racial discrimination from the process of jury selection set in motion a 
series of modifications in lawyer decision making which have changed 
how lawyers fill the jury box. Prior to Batson, th'e sacrosanct tool 
known as the peremptory challenge had been virtually unassailable as a 
jury selection weapon. 5 Abuses by prosecutors, particularly in the 
years of litigation in state courts and in the Supreme Court in which we were fre-
quent adversaries. 
1. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF 1HE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
877 (2d ed. 1957). 
2. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ENGLISH LITERATIJRE 992 (Margaret Drabble 
ed., 5th ed. 1985). 
3. 476 U,S. 79 (1986). Batson held for the first time that a criminal defendant 
could object to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges and provided a proce-
dural mechanism for questioning such a decision by the prosecutor during the jury 
selection process. See id. at 86; see also infra Part II. 
4. Generally, lawyers in a trial select a jury by choosing twelve individuals from 
a larger panel of citizens that come before the court and answer questions about 
themselves. Voir dire is the process where information is obtained from jurors in 
order to determine whether they should be disqualified because of some bias that 
makes them unable to serve. Often jurors are simply rejected after voir dire by one 
of the parties as unsuitable by the use of a peremptory challenge which, prior to 
Batson, could not be questioned. 
"[f]he critical importance of voir dire is illustrated by research demonstrating 
that approximately eighty percent of jurors make up their minds by the conclusion of 
opening statements. Other research, conducted in trial simulations . . . suggests that 
jurors' decisions are made even earlier." V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, 
JURY SELECTION: AN ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO JURY LAW AND METHODS § 8.0, at 
223-24 (1985) (footnotes omitted). 
5. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 118-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "Long ago it was 
recognized that '[t]he right of challenge is almost essential for the purpose of secur-
ing perfect fairness and impartiality in a trial.' The peremptory challenge has been in 
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southern United States,6 had prompted concerns that some improper 
uses of the challenge should be easier to prove.7 Batson provided more 
flexibility by lowering the "crippling burden of proof' that had existed 
for many years.s In doing so, however, the Court has raised serious 
questions about the proper role of juries and the responsibilities of 
lawyers as both attempt to do their job making important decisions in 
the justice process. 
In the decade that followed the Batson decision, the Court spawned 
a number of opinions9 that have made the rules of jury selection so 
difficult to understand that even a lawyer who ethically seeks to follow 
the law may have considerable problems deciding what the law will 
permit. This circumstance has been further complicated by how the 
Batson rules affect a lawyer's obligation to attempt to select the best 
possible jury to hear the case on behalf of his client. 10 The lawyer's 
ethical obligation to be a zealous advocate will often place him in di-
rect conflict with the current jury selection law. 
use without scrutiny into its basis for nearly as long as Junes have existed." Id. 
(quoting WILLIAM FORSYTII, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 145 (1878}). 
6. See LEON F. LI1WACK, NORTII OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN TIlE FREE 
STATES 1790-1860, at 94 (1961). Indeed no African American served on any trial 
jury in the United States, North or South, until 1860. See id. 
"The problem of the effect of racial composition on a jury and its verdict is 
most noticeable when the trial involves a blatantly racial issue." HIROSHI FUKURAI ET 
AL., RACE AND TIlE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND TIlE SEARCH FOR Jus-
TICE 5 (1993). An example of such a racially charged issue was the trial of Byron 
D. La Beckwith for the murder of the Mississippi civil rights leader Medgar Evers in 
1963. It was not until a racially mixed jury heard the case in 1994 that a conviction 
was obtained. See Ronald Smothers, White Supremacist is Convicted of Slaying Rights 
Leader in '63, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1994, at AI, A30. 
In the first trial "[i]t took four days to select a jury for the trial. In the end, 
none of the six Negroes on the panel of 106 jurors was selected, and, when it was 
over, there were twelve white men in the jury box." MYRLIE B. EVERS & WILLIAM 
PETERS, FOR Us, THE LIVING 354 (1967). 
7. Prior to Batson, blacks were challenged from juries in some jurisdictions at 
an alarmingly high rate. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 848 (8th 
Cir. 1975) (discussing that in 15 criminal trials, 81% of black jurors were struck in 
cases involving black defendants). 
8. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92. 
9. See infra Part III. 
10. A lawyer representing a criminal defendant has an obligation to make his 
client's best interest a primary concern. Even the Supreme Court has recognized 
"[u]ndivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service to a client are prized traditions of 
the American lawyer." Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-26 (1948) (footnote 
omitted). 
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Indeed, Batson and its progeny have developed into a system of 
rules that not only encourage, but often require, lawyers attempting to 
select juries to lie to judges, clients, other lawyers, and even to them-
selves as they navigate the conflicting goals presented on the roily 
waters of jury selection. 
This Article is an attempt to address the ethical tragedies that have 
been created by a system that encourages lawyers to manufacture better 
race-neutral reasons for why they have excluded a particular juror. A 
lawyer may engage in this enterprise whether he is trying to intentional-
ly disguise illegal conduct or merely attempting to assure that he is not 
perceived as engaging in improper jury selection practices. Either way, 
the legal profession can ill afford to further erode the public's confi-
dence in its integrity and honesty. In my view, a system that creates 
this kind of dishonesty is at least as costly as the system of racial or 
gender discrimination that the rules seek to avoid; II especially when 
there ar~ better alternatives to resolve the problems. 
For decades, race, gender, and a host of other demographic factors 
have played a substantial role in jury selection. 12 Litigants have used 
these factors to predict which jurors might be favorably disposed to 
their case. The concern is not simply the gamesmanship of advocacy, 
but contemplates important policy questions as well. Permitting litigants 
to have a substantial role in selecting the decision maker or shaping the 
decision making body bolsters respect for, and legitimacy of, the out-
come of a trial. 13 This is particularly true in criminal cases where the 
II. It is clear that lawyers do not have the best reputation for honesty and in-
tegrity among members of the general public. See Kenneth Lasson, Lawyering Askew: 
Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice, 74 B.U. L. REv. 723, 725 (1994). 
"[T]he public seems to see lawyers as inherently less ethical than doctors, plumbers, 
or bureaucrats-and attributes to them a failure of compassion and morality that is 
probably more a trait of their profession than of their individual character or upbring-
ing." Id. 
12. There is a notion that jury selection techniques assisted by social sciences 
research presents a somewhat cynical view of jury independence. One observer has 
noted that "U]ury research assumes that stereotypes are valid and that jury deliberation 
is merely an exercise in small-group dynamics. It tends to recommend that a lawyer 
match the presentation of his case-its style, its volume, its color-to the precon-
ceived psychological variables of a specific type of juror." PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES 
ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 148 (1984). 
13. It is important that lawyers never lose sight that their relationship with the 
client is one of agent and counselor, but not as a parent, who makes all the impor-
tant decisions for the child: 
The client's preferences should always be taken into account. At the 
end of the day, it is the client, and not the client's lawyer, who must live 
Winter, 1998] RESOLVING EtHICAL TRAGEDIES 347 
jury is charged with the awesome responsibility over a person's liberty, 
or even life or death.14 
I propose that the jury selection process be changed to permit the 
criminal defendant, at his option, to actually select from a pool of qual-
ified jurors, people he believes are favorable to his case. I would per-
mit the prosecutor to respond to that choice by making a choice of his 
own, limited by the number that the defendant has directly selected. In 
this way I believe we can remove much of the cat and mouse game of 
lawyers offering contrived reasons for challenging jurors. 
This process will also clarify the host of questions raised by the use 
of jury selection professionals which, I believe, under the current law 
may well be illegal, since the advice they provide often relies on demo-
graphic data that includes assumptions and stereotypes about race 
and gender: s 
with the jury's verdict. The lawyer will proceed to a new case. The client 
does not enjoy this luxury; the jury's verdict is likely to end the matter. The 
client will not only appreciate being consulted, but is more likely to be ac-
cepting of whatever verdict comes from a jury regarding whose makeup he 
or she was consulted. 
JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELEcnON: THE LAW, ART, AND 
SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY 484 (2d ed .. 1990) (footnote omitted). 
14. This Article is limited to jury selection in the criminal context. Although I 
believe that many, if not all, of my proposals would be suitable for civil trials, my 
emphasis on the criminal trial is the result of my belief that the Batson problem is 
more prevalent in criminal cases. See REpORT ON THE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHAL-
LENGES IN CRIMINAL CASES IN THE WAKE OF BATSON V. KENTUCKY, MARYLAND 
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF CRIMINAL LAW AND PRAcnCE 9 (1996) (dis-
cussing that a judge's survey confirmed "that Batson appears most frequently in the 
criminal context"). This is not to suggest that the ethical issues it raises in civil trials 
are not important. As the Supreme Court has said, the civil trial has "so firm a place 
in our history," Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935), and thus is "so funda-
mental and sacred to the citizen," that it must "be jealously guarded by the courts." 
Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942). 
"[I]n the latter half of the' twentieth century, as civil lawsuits become longer 
and more complex, service on a civil jury has become an increasingly hair-raising 
prospect." ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, IN OUR DEFENSE: THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS IN ACTION 275 (1991). 
15. In Part III, I will discuss whether use of jury selection professionals is a 
violation of civil rights, and perhaps even criminal law. See infra Part III. It must be 
acknowledged that jury selection professionals often intentionally use race and gender 
assumptions in their analysis. Indeed, the social sciences have had a profound effect 
on jury selection. Many studies have revealed that "background characteristics of ju-
rors such as race, sex, and age, among others, have been associated with certain ver-
dict preferences." JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY 
§ 2-102, at 15 (1987). However, determining what those verdict preferences will be is 
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I will also propose several refonns that focus on the education of 
the jury and the infonnation lawyers receive about the jurors through 
the voir dire process. 16 I will also present refonns designed to stimu-
late greater community education and inclusiveness in jury pools by 
requiring teenagers seeking their driver's license to complete mandatory 
juror citizenship training in order to instill the importance of the jury 
system in our country to the next generation of decision makers. 
My hope is to place the concern over discrimination in jury selec-
tion in its proper context with the need for legitimate advocacy. Justice 
will be better served by replacing the current system which invites and 
tolerates dishonesty. Through these refonns, it is my hope to strengthen 
the greatest jury system in the history of civilization. l ? 
quite another matter. Reaching a conclusion about what a particular jury will do is 
quite "complex and often very subtle." Id. 
Of course, stereotypes are at the root of the social sciences research. One 
scholar has observed that: 
Each stereotype, whether group or personal, represents all things or 
persons of a given class and is the basis for reaching decisions affecting con-
duct toward others in that class. . . . 
This might seem strange and somewhat foolish, but we must recognize 
that it makes for simplicity and effi<;iency when it is necessary to make rapid 
and frequent adjustments to many people in a wide variety of situations 
where there is little opportunity for careful, judicious study and the weighing 
of a multiplicity of observations. 
PAUL A.F. WALTER, JR., RACE AND CULTIJRE RELATIONS 34 (1952). 
Since selection of a jury involves· "rapid" decisions, "frequent" judgements and 
"little opportunity" to "careful[lyJ" study individual jurors, it is highly and perhaps 
hopelessly susceptible to stereotyping of all kinds. Id. 
16. In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), the United States Supreme Court 
stated that "part of the guarantee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury is an 
adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors." Id. at 729. Without voir dire, the 
trial judge's ability to exercise his duty to remove jurors who cannot impartially 
evaluate the evidence would be impossible. See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 
U.S. 182, 191 (1981) (White, J., plurality opinion). 
17. The right to a jury trial, considered so sacrosanct at the founding of the Unit-
ed States, that when compared to other rights among the Bill of Rights James Madi-
son is reported to have said that it was '''the most valuable [sic] on [sic] the whole 
list. ", ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTII OF TIlE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 
208 (1955) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 755 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789». 
"Ever since the seventeenth century when juries began to express sentiments 
against the government, there has been a tendency for the jury to become, at least in 
popular thought, a safeguard of political liberty." THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A 
CONCISE HISTORY OF TIlE COMMON LAW 107 (5th ed. 1956). 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft once observed that "[t]he great bulwark and 
protection of the individual . . . against the power of the government and the 
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II. ACT I: DIE TRAGEDY OF HISTORY 
The well intentioned rule in Batson has become a confusing maze, thus 
failing to adequately accomplish any of the purposes of either those 
who supported unbridled peremptory challenges, or those who oppose 
such challenges entirely. 
A. Addressing Original Sin: The Birth of Batson and Beyond 
There is a cruel irony in the jury system that the very element of 
public consensus that gives it its democratic character may, in the same 
breath, lead to controversial and unjust verdicts that many of us abhor. 
Such has been the experience with racial discrimination in the jury 
system in American criminal justice. On the one hand, we applaud our 
jury system as inclusive and democratic. IS On the other, it had become 
king ... was [the] trial by jury." William H. Taft, The Administration of Criminal 
Law, 15 YALE LJ. I, 4 (1905). 
William O. Douglas reminds us that although a jury "is sometimes the victim 
of passion[,] . . . it also takes the sharp edges off a law and uses conscience to 
ameliorate a hardship. Since it is of and from the community, it gives the law an 
acceptance which verdicts of judges could not do." WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, AN AL-
MANAC OF LmERTY 112 (1954). 
18. The notion of ordinary citizens exercising power over important decisions is 
one of the unique features of the jury system. 
The Supreme Court has observed that "[o]n many occasions, fully known to the 
Founders of this country, jurors-plain people-have ... stood up in defense of 
liberty ... despite prevailing hysteria and prejudices." United States ex rei. Toth v. 
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1955) (footnote omitted). The right to a jury trial has 
been praised throughout history despite its flaws. In rejecting alternatives to the jury 
trial, Sir William Blackstone said, "however convenient these [alternatives] may appear 
at first, . . . yet let it be again remembered, that delays, and little inconveniences in 
the form of justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in 
more substantial matters." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ·350. 
Noted historian Lawrence M. Friedman has explained that: 
In American legal theory, jury power was enormous, and subject to few con-
trols. There was a maxim of law that the jury was judge both of law and 
fact in criminal cases. This [maxim of law] was particularly strong in the 
first, Revolutionary generation, when memories of royal justice were fresh. 
LA WRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 284 (2d ed. 1985). 
However, its democratic features have historically had their own limitations. 
Noted trial lawyer Gerry Spence has commented that the jury system, as developed 
by the Founding Fathers, was "never intended to give . . . the right to vote or the 
power of the jury to the poor, to blacks, or to women. Because juries were made up 
only of trusted members of the ruling class." GERRY SPENCE, WIll{ JUSTICE FOR 
NONE: DESTROYING AN AMERICAN Mvrn 88 (1989). 
The contradictions between the democratic values of the jury and the historical 
limitations imposed on the people who could serve has become the touchstone for 
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hopelessly entangled in the same pervasive racial discrimination 19 
which paralyzed every political institution in our Nation during the 
dubious period in our history known as "Jim CroW.,,20 Racial discrimi-
nation in criminal justice was certainly not surprising considering it was 
born out of the harsh slave codes21 of colonial and post-revolutionary 
America, which, for the most part, even forbade the testimony of a 
negro in court.22 
many of the cnt1clsms of the jury that exist today. 
19. Racial discrimination in the criminal justice system has long been inextricably 
linked to the right to vote since most jury panels are drawn from voting lists. There 
has been an unfortunate history of bias that had resulted in relatively few African 
Americans being registered to vote prior to the middle 1960s. 
Intimidation tactics by governmental officials designed to discourage voter regis-
tration were not uncommon. For example, during the height of the civil rights move-
ment, Sheriff's deputies of Terrell County, Georgia, barged into a local black church, 
"scowled and rubbed their guns" as Sheriff Z. T. Mathews of Terrell County "lec-
tured from the pulpit on why no more than the current 51 Negroes, out of the 
county's 8,209, need be registered to vote." TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING TIlE WATERS: 
AMERICA IN TIlE KING YEARS 1954-63, at 619 (1988). 
20. "Jim Crow" laws, which enforced legal separation among the races, charac-
terized the period of American history at the tum of the twentieth century up to the 
middle 1950s and 1960s. "Jim Crow" laws were able to thrive because of the erosion 
of the right to vote which occurred after Reconstruction. As noted historian John 
Hope Franklin observed, "[o]nce the Negro was disfranchised, everything else neces-
sary for White Supremacy could be done." JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO 
FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 342 (3d ed. 1967). 
21. As early as 1680, states enacted slave codes which laid out more severe pun-
ishment for blacks committing the same offenses as whites. See DON E. 
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW & 
POLITICS 3 I (1978). 
Id. 
For instance, conviction of raping a white woman, which meant a prison sen-
tence of two to twenty years for a white offender, carried a mandatory death 
penalty for Negro offenders. Even attempted rape of a white woman by a 
black man could be punished by death, at the discretion of the court. On the 
other hand, rape of a slave or a free Negro by a white man was punishable 
"by fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court." 
22. In some states, like Virginia, negroes were not even permitted to testifY in a 
murder case when the defendant was white. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. 
Michael Higginbotham, "Yearning to Breathe Free ": Legal Barriers Against and Op-
tions in Favor of Liberty in Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.V. L. REv. 1213, 1239-40 
n.142 (1993). "Although most northern blacks gained access to the regular court sys-
tem by the middle of the nineteenth century, their testimony, when permitted against 
a white person, was rendered virtually meaningless by all-white juries." Douglas L. 
Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against 
the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REv. I, 7 (1990). 
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Although several constitutional amendments23 and reforms during 
Reconstruction24 attempted to equalize the status of the newly freed 
slaves, once Reconstruction collapsed, the injustices of the slavery era 
returned with the vengeance of a fast spreading communicable dis-
ease.2S It was not until well into the first half of the twentieth century 
that the criminal justice reforms of the Warren Courf6 addressed racial 
discrimination in any meaningful way.27 
23. In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery; in 1868, the Fourteenth 
Amendment provided for equal protection of the laws; and the Fifteenth Amendment, 
ratified in 1870, provided the right to vote to the newly freed slaves. 
24. Reconstruction was the period of American .history after the Civil War until 
around 1877, where the federal government attempted to carry out the adjustment of 
the recently freed slaves into their new role in America. See generally ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REvOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988) (providing 
an insightful and detailed discussion of the Reconstruction period). 
It was not long after the Civil War that the question of whether blacks would 
have the right to vote was addressed by the federal government. See JAMES M. 
MCPHERSON, BATILE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 707 (1988). In Lou-
isiana, for example, an 1864 legislative debate over a petition of several free blacks 
to vote was presented to President Lincoln. See id. The measure only received his 
lukewarm support. See id. When the Constitutional Convention took up the question 
of blacks voting, the President said, '''I barely suggest for your private consideration, 
whether some of the colored people may not be let in [to vote]-as, for instance, the 
very intelligent, and especially those who have fought gallantly in our ranks. '" ld. It 
was not until six years later that black men were given the right to vote. See supra 
note 23. 
During some portion of the Reconstruction period, "juries invariably consisted 
of white and black Republicans, with blacks sometimes outnumbering whites. Southern 
Democrats interpreted the racial and political composition of federal juries as incontro-
vertable evidence of political persecution through judicial injustice." Robert J. 
Kaczorowski, Federal Enforcement of Civil Rights During the First Reconstruction, 23 
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 15~, 172 (1995) (footnote omitted). 
25. Reconstruction collapsed after a complex series of political events and epi-
sodes of corruption by federal Reconstruction officials. See JOHN D. HICKS, A SHORT 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 437-38 (1949). These circumstances led to a 
change in the attitude of northerners toward the South: 
the pressure of northern opinion for greater leniency toward the South forced 
Congress to pass an Amnesty Act, in May, 1872, that reduced the number of 
ex-Confederates excluded from the suffrage .... Gradually, in state after 
state, Democratic majorities took over the administration of government, car-
pet-baggers were expelled, and great numbers of Negroes ceased to vote. 
ld. at 438. 
26. The Warren Court revolutionized the criminal justice process by obligating the 
states to recognize many rights contained in the federal Constitution. For a discussion 
of the Warren Court's jurisprudence in this area, see ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE 
MODERN SUPREME COURT (1972). 
27. Occasionally, the Supreme Court would decide a case in favor of a black de-
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One provocative account of the criminal justice system in existence 
in the early twentieth century involved the community of Phillips Coun-
ty, Arkansas, in the "Black Belt" of the South around 1919. Although 
more than seventy-five percent of the county's' population was black 
and 18,000 of its residents were of voting age, "[n]o Negro had served 
on either a grand jury or a trial jury in 30 years.,,28 Such circumstanc-
es had become normal in the South. "Southern jurors knew full well 
that they were selected on a racially discriminatory basis; it would have 
been more than a miracle if their verdicts had not reflected the discrim-
ination exercised in their own selection."29 It was not until the 1930s 
and the famous "Scottsboro Boys" cases that the issues of racial bias in 
jury selection and the need for effective legal counsel gained the atten-
tion of the entire nation.30 
Theoretically, it has long been a violation of law to systematically 
exclude potential jurors on racial grounds. In Strauder v. West Virgin-
fendant and against the mcist climate. An example of one such case was Moore v, 
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). In that case, the Court overturned a district court's 
refusal to review the allegations in a black defendant's habeas corpus petition. See id. 
at 87. The basis of the defendant's claim was that his trial was dominated by a riot-
ous mob. See id. at 87-89. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., writing for the 7-2 
Court, said: 
if in fact a trial is dominated by a mob so . . . there is a departure from 
due process of law; ... "if the State [sic], supplying no corrective process, 
carries into execution a judgment of death or imprisonment based upon a 
verdict thus produced by mob domination, the State [sic] deprives the accused 
of his life or liberty without due process of law." 
Id. at 90-91 (quoting Frank v. Manqum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915». 
Although Justice Holmes was willing to rule in favor of the black defendant in 
Moore, he still expressed his belief that the desires of the community play a large 
part in the justice system. See id. at 88-9\. Many years earlier he had observed that 
"[t]he first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the 
actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong." OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963). 
28. LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF 1HE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO 232 (1966). 
29. Jd. at 240. 
30. The series of trials that came to be known as the "Scottsboro Boys" cases 
focused the attention of the country on discrimination in the criminal justice system, 
primarily in the South. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49-53 (1932). The 
incident involved charges of mpe against black youths accused by a white woman 
under prejudicial circumstances. See id. at 49. At the center of the controversy was 
the mcial discrimination in jury selection in the case. See id. at 50. Under question-
ing at a hearing, prior to jury selection at a retrial of one of the defendants, a Mor-
gan County, Alabama jury commissioner said "he had never met a Negro fit for jury 
duty." JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO 123 (1994) (footnote omitted). 
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ia,l' the Supreme Court held racial discrimination in jury selection was 
prohibited.32 Clearly, the letter of the law had consistently been ig-
nored through a series of clever devices that kept blacks from even get-
ting near the courthouse doors.33 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, 
though recognizing the right to a jury where there was no discrimina-
tion,34 permitted discrimination through the unassailable use of the pe-
remptory challenge. If a black citizen managed to navigate the voter 
registration hurdle and the selection for the jury pool hurdle, the prose-
cutor in most instances could simply dismiss the few survivors with one 
of its several peremptory challenges.3s 
When the Supreme Court ultimately changed the ease with which 
black jurors could be removed from jury service in its landmark deci-
sion in Batson v. Kentucky,36 it was as if a great earthquake had shak-
en a mighty stone wall. That wall was the case of Swain v. Alabamd7 
decided in the mid-1960s, but reflecting the sentiment about peremptory 
challenges that had been in existence long before. Batson expressly 
"reexamine[d] that portion of Swain v. Alabama concerning the eviden-
tiary burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he has 
been denied equal protection through the State's use of peremptory 
31. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
32. See id. at 306-09. 
33. "PoIling places were frequently set up far from Negro communities, and the 
more diligent Negroes failed to reach them upon finding roads blocked and ferries 
conveniently 'out of repair' at election time." FRANKLIN, supra note 20, at 333. 
In the 1890s, Mississippi employed a poll tax, among other requirements, which 
limited negroes from the vote. See BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN 1lffi MAKING 
OF AMERJCA 172 (1996). "[S]ome southern states hastened to pass 'grandfather 
clauses,' bestowing the [right to vote] upon those whose grandfathers had voted." ld. 
Some states would give blacks difficult "voter registration literacy test[s]." DA-
VID 1. GARROW, BEARING lHE CROSS: MARTIN LUlHER KING, JR., AND 1lffi SOUlH-
ERN CHRJSTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 378 (1986). These tests would often involve 
a requirement that the "applicantD for voter registration be able to read, write, and 
interpret the Constitution." FRED D. GRAY, Bus RIDE TO JUSTICE 111 (1995). Some 
voting registrars even engaged in the rather pathetic practice of registering all white 
applicants and then hiding. See id. Others "would resign before registering African 
Americans in any significant numbers." ld. 
All of these techniques had a corresponding detrimental effect on the number 
of blacks available to make up jury pools even though many of these practices were 
ultimately ruled unconstitutional or rendered illegal by federal voter's rights legisla-
tion. 
34. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-09. 
35. See supra note 6. 
36. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
37. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
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challenges to exclude members of his race from the petit jury.,,38 
In Batson, a black defendant, charged with burglary and receiving 
stolen goods,. complained that his all white jury was selected largely by 
the prosecutor's removal of the black venireman by the use of peremp-
tory challenges.39 All four potential black jurors were struck by the 
prosecutor.40 Batson's counsel raised an objection to the prosecutor's 
conduct at the trial level under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution.41 Batson's attorney also requested a 
hearing.42 "Without expressly ruling on the request for a hearing, the 
trial judge observed that the parties were entitled to use their perempto-
ry challenges to 'strike anybody they want to. ",43 
On appeal, petitioner conceded that Swain foreclosed his equal pro-
tection claim.44 Instead, Batson pressed a Sixth Amendment fair cross-
section claim and an independent state ground; section 11 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution.4s The Kentucky State Supreme Court did not adopt 
the petitioner's fair cross-section rationale, citing its reliance on 
Swain,46 Batson successfully petitioned the Supreme Court on the Sixth 
Amendment fair cross-section claim.47 In a surprising holding that de-
fies coherent interpretation, the Supreme Court reversed.48 
In an opinion by Justice Lewis Powell, the Court held that 
"[p]urposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a 
defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protec-
tion that a trial by jury is intended to secure.'>49 Justice Powell ex-
plained that the very idea of the jury body is that it be composed of 
'''neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in 
society as that which he [the person having the right to select the jury] 
holds. ",so He further noted that "[t]he petit jury has occupied a central 
38. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
39. See id. at 82-83. 
40. See id. at 83. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. 
43. Id. 
44. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. at 84. 
47. See id. 
48. See id. The problem of lack of clarity created by Batson occurred because the 
Court mixed several constitutional principles throughout the opinion. Thus, the deci-
sion became a curious hybrid, part Sixth Amendment fair cross-section, part equal 
protection, and part substantive due process. 
49. Id. at 86. 
50. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 
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position in our system of justice by safeguarding a person accused of 
crime against the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or judge."sl 
The Court's emphasis in Batson is a crucial point because the pro-
tection created by that' case appears to have special significance for 
criminal defendants. The Court would later depart from this exclusive 
focus on criminal cases to expand Batson's prohibitions to other partici-
pants in the justice system.52 
The reason that Batson was later expanded so broadly can probably 
be explained by reference to a curious tum in Justice Powell's opinion. 
After initially stressing the defendant's right to select a jury from 
"peers or equals," the Court changed direction and began to discuss the 
notion that the harm from discriminatory jury selection extended "to 
touch the entire community."SJ While this may have been a somewhat 
accurate and even a well intended observation, it ultimately led to prob-
lems determining the true basis of the Batson holding. 
Most of Justice Powell's discussion was directed to the problem of 
black defendants being denied black jurors.54 The Court noted that 
"[d]iscrimination within the judicial system is most pernicious because it 
is 'a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to secur-
ing to [black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure 
to all others. ",55 In analyzing the Court's earlier opinion in Swain, he 
explained that although the opinion did not sanction racial discrimina-
tion in jury selection, it nonetheless acknowledged that "[t]he Court 
sought to accommodate the prosecutor's historical privilege of peremp-
tory challenge free of judicial control."S6 
This accommodation was practiced regularly before Swain and there-
308 (1879». 
51. Id. The jury trial is a vital hedge against the virtually limitless discretion of 
the local prosecutors who may have more than justice on their mind as criminal cases 
are pursued. As one observer has explained: 
There are almost no legislative rules for prosecutors to follow, and the courts 
have been reluctant to set down any norms or to overrule prosecutors' deci-
sions. The absence of effective limits on prosecutorial discretion creates the 
potential for corruption, as well as for abuse of power for personal or parti-
san political ends. The latter potential is exacerbated by the fact that the post 
of prosecutor always has been a stepping stone to the judiciary or to higher 
elective office. 
CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 283 (1978). 
52. See infra notes 107-94 and accompanying text. 
53. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87. 
54. See id. at 88-90. 
55. Id. at 87-88 (quoting Strauder, 160 U.S. at 308). 
56. Id. at 91. 
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in resulted in a criminal defendant having the sole remedy to establish 
racial discrimination in jury selection only if he could demonstrate that 
the prosecutor engaged in racial discrimination in a series of cases. In 
the language of Justice White's opinion in Swain, an equal protection 
claim could only be made if the prosecutor "in case after case, whatev-
er the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or 
the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have 
been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who 
have survived challenges for cause. ,,57 Only after meeting such a bur-
den could a defendant establish a case for purposeful discrimination. 
Simply stated, the defendant was required to show a pattern of ex-
clusion in a number of different cases rather than a pattern of excluding 
black jurors in a single case. Justice Powell properly characterized this 
method of challenging racial discrimination as placing upon the "defen-
dant[] a crippling burden of proof.,,58 It was this procedural cerberus59 
that prompted the Supreme Court to strike down the portion of the 
Swain opinion that made the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges 
·"largely immune from constitutional scrutiny.'>6O 
While acknowledging that in an equal protection case the burden of 
proof to show purposeful discrimination in jury selection is clearly on 
the defendant,61 when deciding whether the burden has been met, the 
Court said it must engage in '''a sensitive inquiry into such circumstan-
tial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. ",62 That is, cir-
57. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965). 
58. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92 (footnote omitted). 
59. In Greek Mythology, Cerberus was a three-headed dog that guarded the en-
trance to Hades. See ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA II READY REFERENCE 691 (1976). 
The Cerberus, a vigilant guardian according to ancient lore, had to be subdued by 
Hercules as the last of his twelve mythical heroic labors. See WEBSTER'S NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF TIlE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1167 (2d ed. 1957). Over-
coming Swain was indeed a Herculean task inasmuch as "[i]n the 21 year period that 
Swain was good law, only two defendants managed to meet Swain's requirements." 
Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory 
Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REv. 517, 530 n.63 (1992) (citing State v. Washington, 375 
So. 2d 1162, 1163-65 (La. 1979) (holding that the first twelve blacks challenged 
established a prima facie case); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751, 753-54 (La. 1979) 
(discussing that the peremptory challenge of all blacks on venire and history of chal-
lenges against blacks was sufficient to meet the Swain test)). 
60. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93. Swain had received a good deal of scholarly criti-
cism prior to Batson. See, e.g., Robert L. Doyel, In Search of a Remedy for the 
RaCially Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 38 OKLA. L. REv. 385 (1985). 
61. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. 
62. /d. (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
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cumstantial proof of apparent racially motivated conduct can be taken 
into account in establishing whether improper racially motivated conduct 
in jury selection has occurred. 
The Court cited an example of what might indicate racial bias in 
jury selection as the "'total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of 
Negroes from the jury venires. ",63 Once the defendant claimed improp-
er racial exclusion had occurred in the selection of his jury, the trial 
court would be required to follow a procedure and conduct a hearing to 
determine whether the prosecutor could justify his reasons.64 
In developing this new procedural tool, Justice Powell rejected the 
State's concern that such a procedure would "create seriousadministra-
tive difficulties.,,65 As it turned out, his conclusion may have been one 
of the most shortsighted legal projections of all-time.66 The Court not 
only brushed aside the administrative obstacles in implementing the new 
system, but it also "decline[d] ... to formulate particular procedures to 
be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's chal-
lenges.,,67 The Court balked at formulating any procedural guidance 
because of what it described as "the variety of jury selection practices 
followed in our state and federal trial courts. "68 
The Batson Court spawned three concurring opinions which are 
252, 266 (1977)). 
63. Id. (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)). 
(:14. See id.· at 96-97. The Court explained how the Batson procedure would be 
used: 
In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, the 
trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For example, a "pattern" 
of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give 
rise to an inference of discrimination. . . . 
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to 
the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black 
jurors. Though this requirement imposes a limitation in some cases on the 
full peremptory character of the historic challenge, we emphasize that the 
prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a 
challenge for cause. But the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima 
facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the 
defendant's race on the assumption--or his intuitive judgment-that they 
would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race. 
/d. (citations omitted). 
65. Id. at 99. 
66. Justice Powell noted that "those States applying a version of the evidentiary 
standard we recognize today . . . have not experienced serious administrative bur-
dens." Id. (footnote omitted). 
67. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 (footnote omitted). 
68. Id. at 99 n.24. 
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important in understanding the development of the doctrine that 
emerged over the decade which followed. The first, written by Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, applauded what he called an "eloquent opinion [of] 
the Court, which takes a historic step toward eliminating the shameful 
practice of racial discrimination in the selection of juries.'>69 He ex-
plained that "[t]he Court's opinIOn... ably demonstrates the 
inadequacy of any burden of proof for racially discriminato-
ry ... peremptories.,,70 
Although Justice Marshall offered high praise for Powell's conclu-
sion, he was clearly not pleased with the procedural mechanism it had 
created. 71 Justice Marshall bluntly remarked that "[t]he decision today 
will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the 
jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminat-
ing peremptory challenges entirely.'>72 In support of his position, Jus-
tice Marshall cited several statistical studies that indicated the misuse of 
peremptories against black jurors.73 He concluded that the use of 
peremptories against blacks had been "both common and flagrant.,,74 
Foreshadowing the pervasive problem of how one was to evaluate 
the truthfulness of reasons a prosecutor might offer to justify a chal-
lenge on a non-racial basis, Justice Marshall quipped that "[a]ny prose-
cutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and 
trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons.,,75 Justice 
Marshall was troubled that explanations justifying strikes against black 
jurors could be easily generated and would likely make the protection 
established by the Court in Batson merely "illusory.,,76 He not only 
feared outright dishonesty, but also "unconscious racism,'>77 which 
69. ld. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
70. ld. (Marshall, J., concurring). 
71. See id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
72. ld. (Marshall, 1., concurring). Some scholars have embraced Justice Marshall's 
view. See. e.g., Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be 
Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 369, 422 (1992) ("We must make reasonably certain 
that our juries represent the conscience of the community and that no citizen, on the 
basis of invidious discrimination, . will ever be excluded from participating in this most 
important responsibility of citizenship .... "). 
73. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
74. ld. (Marshall, J., concurring). 
75. ld. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
76. ld. (Marshall, J., concurring). 
77. ld. (Marshall, J., concurring). Some scholars have examined the subject of 
unconscious prejudice and what role it may play in jury selection. See, e.g., Charles 
R. Lawrence III, The ld, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). 
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might lead a prosecutor to easily conclude "that a prospective black 
juror is 'sullen,' or 'distant,' a characterization that would not have 
come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically."78 
Justice Marshall speculated that "[e]ven if all parties approach[ed] 
the Court's mandate with the best of conscious intentions, that mandate 
requires them to confront and overcome their own racism on all lev-
els-a challenge I doubt all of them can meet."79 Justice Marshall also 
found unacceptable the notion that peremptories should be eliminated 
for the prosecution, but not the defense attorney.80 He wrote that "[i]f 
the prosecutor's peremptory challenge could be eliminated only at the 
cost of eliminating the defendant's challenge as well, I do not think 
that would be too great a price to pay."81 
It appears that Marshall's assessment of the appropriate jury selec-
tion procedure would be that any twelve jurors from the community, 
not excusable for cause,82 would be preferred over a system that risks 
the racial discrimination practiced in the use of peremptory challenges. 
His concurring opinion endorses random juries, not because he believed 
a defendant cannot benefit from peremptory challenges, but rather be-
cause of his fear that the continued use of peremptories would hurt 
blacks more in the long run.8) 
The two remaining concurring opinions focused on procedural mat-
ters related to peremptories. Those matters would become key to the 
legal developments in subsequent Batson progeny. Justices Brennan and 
78. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
79. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). 
80. Id. at 108 (Marshall, 1., concurring). 
81. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall's view that there is no way to avoid 
eliminating the peremptory challenge is perhaps the most controversial issue that has 
emerged from the Batson opinion. See id. (Marshall, 1., concurring). However, even 
those who do not support the unbridled use of peremptories recognize that there are 
costs involved if they are eliminated. One scholar has written: 
The elimination of the peremptory involves trade-offs. . . . Without 
peremptories, parties will no longer exercise any oversight about who can be 
excused, thus making the correction of judicial error more difficult. And 
finally, the elimination of peremptories would mark a departure from tradi-
tion, and some would argue that the tradition should not be discarded be-
cause it has served us well. 
Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 
73 TEX. L. REv. 1041, 1137 (1995). 
82. A challenge for cause indicates that a juror would be disqualified by reason 
of being biased by any number of circumstances, for example, being unable to fairly 
judge the evidence because of a business relationship with a party or a witness. 
83. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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Stevens joined in an opinion which cautioned against the Court request-
ing issues be addressed that were not briefed by the parties or decided 
in the lower courtS.84 Justice O'Connor was concerned that the deci-
sion in Batson not be applied retroactively,85 a view shared by Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice White.86 
In a lengthy dissent, Chief Justice Burger complained vigorously that 
the majority had decided the case on a question not properly before the 
Court.87 He emphasized that certiorari had only been granted on the 
Sixth Amendment fair cross-section ground. 88 He wrote that the 
majority's decision was "truly extraordinary [because] it is based on a 
constitutional argument that the petitioner ha[d] expressly declined to 
raise."89 Thus, he felt it was improper to decide the case on an equal 
protection basis.90 
The Chief Justice was not merely disturbed by the procedural pos-
ture of the case, but he also lamented the demise of the ancient right to 
peremptory challenge, commenting that "[t]oday the Court sets aside the 
peremptory challenge, a procedure which h[ad] been part of the com-
mon law . . . for nearly 200 years.'>91 His opinion doubted the wisdom 
and clarity of the strange equal protection rule adopted by the majori-
ty.92 In attacking the majority, he said, "[r]ather than applying [a] 
straightforward equal protection analysis, the Court substitutes for the 
holding in Swain a curious hybrid.'>9J The Chief Justice was referring 
to the portions of the majority opinion that relied in part on the fair 
cross-section argument94 and the substantive due process rationale,95 
84. See id. at 108-11 (Stevens, 1., concurring). 
85. See id. at III (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
86. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
87. See id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
88. See id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
89. Batson, 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
90. See id. at 112-I3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
91. ld. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
92. See id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
93. ld. at 126 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
94. Prior to the Supreme Court deciding Batson, a number of lower courts had 
reached similar results on Sixth Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Booker v. Jabe, 775 
F.2d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 1985) (imposing limitations on prosecution peremptories. on 
Sixth Amendment grounds), vacated sub nom. Michigan v. Booker, 478 U.S. 1001 
(1986). 
95. In an earlier holding, the Supreme Court had explained that "[w]hen any large 
and identifiable segment of the [population] is excluded from jury service, the effect 
is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human 
experience." Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (~972). 
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but ultimately placing the decision under the equal protection banner.96 
So concerned was Chief Justice Burger about the consequences of 
the majority's opinion, he urged that "[a]t the very least, this important 
case reversing centuries of history and experience ought to be set for 
reargument next term.'>97 Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, said that 
Swain should have been left undisturbed.98 He did "not believe there is 
anything in the Equal Protection Clause, or any other constitutional 
provision, that justifies such a departure from the substantive hold-
. fS' "99 109 ... 0 wam. 
After the decision in Batson, some lower courts demonstrated a 
willingness to occasionally decide that a prosecutor's alleged race-neu-
tral reason was inadequate:oo Various courts rejected explanations 
such as "teachers. . . are too liberal,"lol that a juror '''shucked and 
jived, ",102 the religious affiliation of the juror, 103 a juror having the 
same last name as the defendant,104 a juror that was the same age as 
96. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Justice Powell explained: 
Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to exclude black per-
sons from the venire on the assumption that blacks as a group are unquali-
fied to serve as jurors, so it forbids the States to strike black veniremen on 
the assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply because 
the defendant is black. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
97. Id. at 134 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
98. See id. at 139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
99. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
100. The substance of almost all Batson hearings has become a contest of honesty 
and candor before the trial court attempting to weigh the validity of the reasons of-
fered by counsel. The fear of lawyers fabricating reasons for peremptory challenges 
have lead some commentators to suggest that courts should disallow "intuitive" expla-
nations altogether. Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's Invidious Legacy: Discriminatory 
Jury Selection and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 336, 
362-65 (1993) (arguing that the only answers accepted should be those with a sub-
stantial nexus with the facts of the case). 
101. Powell v. State, 548 So. 2d 590, 594 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (stating that the 
explanation was inadequate since it was not shown to apply to the particular juror). 
102. State v. Tomlin, 384 S.E.2d 707, 710 (S.C. 1989) (stating that the 
prosecutor's explanation evidenced discriminatory motive and voided the impact of the 
race-neutral reason). 
103. See State v. Collier, 553 So. 2d 815, 822-23 (La. 1989) (holding that the 
prosecutor failed to rebut prima facie showing of discrimination in the use of chal-
lenges against black jurors when he gave as reasons their religious affiliations, but 
did not strike white jurors that were the same religion as the challenged black jurors). 
104. See State v. Aragon, 784 P.2d 16, 17, 20 (N.M. 1989) (reasoning was inade-
quate because prosecutor asked no question in voir dire to support his conclusions). 
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the defendant, lOS and the vague explanation that the prosecutor "'just 
got a feeling about him. ",106 
The confusing majority opinion, combined with the dissent's sub-
stantive and procedural objections to the majority's equal protection 
approach, began a ten year odyssey of decisions from the Supreme 
Court that would change the way lawyers and judges would conduct 
jury selection into the next century. 
B. The Children of Batson: Fruit of the Curious Tree 
It was certainly remarkable that, notwithstanding the substantive 
shortcomings of the Batson opinion, the Supreme Court overruled the 
Swain decision at a time when most observers believed that the Court 
was engaged in a rather conservative turn. 107 The apparent victory for 
expanded civil rights in Batson was somewhat unexpected. However, 
the patchwork quilt decision it produced left unanswered far more ques-
tions than it solved. The Court wasted no time in adjusting the scope 
of its precedent. The Court first ruled on whether the Batson rule 
would apply to cases that had been tried before it was decided. 108 
Soon after, in its 1989 Term, the Court heard arguments in Holland 
v. lllinois,I09 which raised the question of whether a white defendant 
could make a Sixth Amendment fair cross-section challenge to blacks 
105. See Carrick v. State, 580 So. 2d 31, 31·32 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (holding 
that the state engaged in unconstitutional disparate treatment of black jurors when it 
challenged black jurors who were the same age as the defendant, while leaving white 
jurors the defendant's age on the panel). 
106. United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1544, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating 
that the prosecutor's explanation was legally insufficient to refute a prima facie case 
of racial discrimination). 
107. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92·93 (1986). The Burger Court was 
considered to be more conservative than the Warren Court which preceded it. See 
DAVID G. SAVAGE, TuRNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF TIfE REHNQUIST SUPREME 
COURT 4 (1992). "In 1969, President Richard Nixon had chosen [Warren Burger] to 
lead a conservative counterrevolution at the Court." Id. A year after Batson when 
Chief Justice Rehnquist was appointed, the Court's jurisprudence was expected to 
become more right wing. See id. at 8. During Chief Justice Rehnquist's confirmation 
process, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund reviewed 83 civil rights cases in which the 
Court had ruled. See id. at 21. "It found Rehnquist had voted against these plaintiffs 
82 times." Id. 
108. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 316 (1987). The Court held that 
Batson applied retroactively to all federal criminal cases pending on direct review or 
not yet finally decided when Batson became law. See id. at 328. 
109. 493 U.S. 474 (1990). 
Winter, 1998] RESOLVING ETHICAL TRAGEDIES 363 
being struck from his petit jury.1I0 In yet another opinion from a 
deeply divided Court, the Sixth Amendment claim was rejected. II I Jus-
tice Scalia, writing for the majority, "reject[ed] petitioner's fundamental 
thesis that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate a 
distinctive group in the community deprives the defendant of a Sixth 
Amendment right to the 'fair possibility' of a representative jury.,,112 
The rejection of the Sixth Amendment claim effectively destroyed, for 
constitutional purposes, what had been a successful attack on perempto-
ry challenges in many lower courts. 
This, however, was only a partial victory for those Justices who did 
not want to see Swain disturbed. A concurring opinion, written by Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy,1IJ agreed that fair cross-section analysis did 
not apply to petitioner's challenge. 114 Nonetheless, in unwavering dic-
ta, he embraced the view "that if the claim here were based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, it would have mer-
it."IIS Justice Kennedy could "see no obvious reason to conclude that 
a defendant's race should deprive him of standing in his own trial to 
vindicate his own jurors' right to sit."116 
The tone of Justice Kennedy's short, but incisive, concurring opin-
ion was intended to make it clear that, although he did not accept 
Holland's Sixth Amendment argument, he clearly did not reject the core 
value of non-discrimination in jury selection. I 17 Thus, anyone who 
could count would realize that Justice Kennedy, along with the four 
dissenters in Holland, constituted a majority that was willing to extend 
the Batson equal protection rationale to white defendants. For Justice 
Kennedy, the equal protection claim was vested in "[a]n important bond 
[between] the accused and an excluded juror.,,118 
In supporting his equal protection dicta, Justice Kennedy made the 
assertion that a juror subjected to a peremptory challenge "will leave 
the courtroom with a lasting sense of exclusion from the experience of 
jury participation, but possessing little incentive or resources to set in 
110. See id. at 475-76. 
Ill. See id. at 478. 
112. Id. 
113. See id. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy was appointed to 
the Court after Chief Justice Burger's retirement and Justice Rehnquist's elevation to 
Chief Justice. 
114. See id. (Kennedy, 1., concurring). 
liS. Holland, 493 U.S. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
116. Id. at 489 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
117. See id. at 488-90 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
118. Id. at 489 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his own rights.,,119 
In dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall again pressed for more consti-
tutional protection against peremptory challenges. 12o He explained why 
he regarded Holland's Sixth Amendment claim as valid. 12I He accused 
the majority of "selective amnesia,,122 regarding the Court's Sixth 
Amendment precedents and in the majority's suggestion that upholding 
the claim "'would cripple the device of peremptory challenge. ",123 Jus-
tice Marshall referred to this complaint by the majority as "stagger-
ing.,,124 
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens stated that he believed the 
Court should have reached the equal protection claim even though it 
had not been raised.12S He also endorsed the petitioner's Sixth Amend-
ment claim.126 He explained that "[a ]fter our recognition [in Batson] 
that a defendant could bring an equal protection challenge to the re-
moval of black jurors in a single case, it is difficult to see why recog-
nition of a Sixth Amendment right would impose any additional bur-
den.,,127 
This conflict in Holland established the basis for the Court's deci-
sion in the very next Term in Powers v. Ohio. 128 In Powers, the 
Court finally recognized, as its majority rule, the rationale of Justice 
Kennedy that a white defendant had an Equal Protection Clause right to 
complain about the exclusion of blacks from his jury.129 This antici-
pated expansion of Batson seemed a welcomed victory for those Justic-
es who embraced the original Batson rule. 130 
The momentum for expanding Batson continued in the very next 
Term with the Court's decision in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Co. 131 In a dramatic extension of its equal protection jurisprudence, 
the Court held that private litigants in a civil case may not use peremp-
119. Id. (Kennedy, 1., concurring). 
120. See id. at 490 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
121. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 490-504 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
122. Id. at 500 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
123. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Id. at 484). 
124. Id. at 501 (Marshall, 1., dissenting). 
125. See id. at 506-07 (Stevens, 1., dissenting). 
126. See id. at 506, 519-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
127. Holland, 493 U.S. at 519-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
128. 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
129. See id. at 416. 
130. See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
131. 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
Winter, 1998] RESOLVING ETHICAL TRAGEDIES 365 
tory challenges to strike jurors on account of race. IJ2 Building on his 
earlier concurring opinion in Hollancf 33 and his opinion for the major-
ity in Powers,134 Justice Kennedy reasoned that, because of the impro-
priety of racial bias in the courtroom, such "race-based exclusion vio-
lates the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors.,,135 Donald 
Edmonson, the plaintiff, was a black construction worker who was in-
jured in a work related accident at Fort Polk, Louisiana.136 He in-
voked his right to a trial by jury and "[d]uring voir dire, Leesville used 
two of its three peremptory challenges authorized by statute to remove 
black persons from the prospective jury.,,131 The trial court denied 
Edmonson's request to have Leesville Concrete articulate race-neutral 
reasons. 138 
In a series of analogies intending to explain the public nexus to. the 
private act of a lawsuit, the Court reasoned that "[w]hen a lawyer exer-
cises a peremptory challenge, the judge advises the juror [that] he or 
she has been excused .... [A] private party could not exercise its 
peremptory challenges absent the overt, significant assistance of the 
court.,,139 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the jury selection pro-
cess "constitutes state action. ,,140 
In eloquent language, Justice Kennedy rendered a surprisingly com-
prehensive rejection of race-based justification in jury selection. 141 He 
wrote: 
It may be true that the role of litigants in determining the jury's 
composition provides one reason for wide acceptance of the jury sys-
tem and of its verdicts. But if race stereotypes are the price for accep-
tance of a jury panel as fair, the price is too high to meet the standard 
of the Constitution. Other means exist for litigants to satisfy themselves 
of a jury's impartiality without using skin color as a test. If our soci-
ety is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must rec-
ognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that 
progress and causes continued hurt and injury. By the dispassionate 
analysis which is its special distinction, the law dispels fears and pre-
conceptions respecting racial attitudes. The quiet rationality of the 
132. See id. at 616. 
133. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text. 
134. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. 
135. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616. 
136. See id. at 616-17. 
137. Id. at 616. 
138. See id. at 616-17. 
139. ld. at 623-24. 
140. Id. at 626. 
141. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630-31. 
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courtroom makes it an appropriate place to confront race-based fears or 
hostility by means other than the use of [racial] stereotypes. Whether 
the race generality employed by litigants to challenge a potential juror 
derives from open hostility or from some hidden and unarticulated fear, 
neither motive entitles the litigant to cause injury to the excused ju-
ror.142 
The only conclusion that can be reasonably drawn from this language is 
that including racial considerations in striking jurors is not only undesir-
able, but it is a violation of the excused juror's constitutional rights. 
Thus, race-based jury selection may be actionable under federal civil, as 
well as criminal, law. '43 
Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia in a dissenting opinion that severely criticized the reasoning of 
the Kennedy majority.'44 She explained that simply because: 
The government erects the platform; it does not thereby become re-
sponsible for all [the work] that occurs upon it. As much as we would 
like to eliminate completely from the courtroom the specter of racial 
discrimination, the Constitution does not sweep that broadly .... [A] 
peremptory strike by a private litigant is fundamentally a matter of 
private choice and not state action. '4s 
She described the peremptory challenge as a tool that "by design, [cre-
ated] an enclave of private action in a government-managed pro-
ceeding. "146 
142. Id. Some scholars embraced Justice Kennedy's view. One such commentator 
passionately wrote that the: 
exclusion of jurors is like exclusion of voters: the exclusion of voters by 
reason of race does violence to constitutional ideals, whether or not the ex-
clusion affects the outcome of any particular election. . . . [\]t stigmatizes the 
entire excluded group, impairs public confidence in the judicial system, and 
may affect some verdicts. Derivative harms of this kind flow from discrimi-
nation in many contexts and reinforce our shared commitment to eradicate 
such discrimination. But it is important to remember that the primary victim 
of discrimination is the person actually excluded by reason of race. 
Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right 
Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725, 727 (1992). 
143. Justice Kennedy noted that all jury selection plans "must implement statutory 
policies of random jury selection from a fair cross section of the community and 
nonexclusion on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic sta-
tus." Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622 (citations omitted); see also infra notes 251-52 and 
accompanying text (suggesting that any practice inconsistent with race or gender-neu-
tral goals is unlawful). 
144. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
145. Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
146. Id. at 633-34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Some scholars have disagreed with 
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In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia commented that the 
majority's opinion was not only an inaccurate statement of the law of 
state action, but was simply a gesture demonstrating the Court's "un-
compromising hostility to race-based judgments, even by private ac-
tors.,,147 Justice Scalia explained, that in his view, the Court's expan-
sion of Batson to civil cases would come at a high price, and he sug-
gested that "much of it will be paid by the minority litigants who use 
our courts. ,,148 
Even though protection appeared to be expanding for minorities 
under the Batson doctrine, criminal defense counsel were about to re-
ceive a jolt that would remove what had been a monopoly of protection 
under the Batson rule. In the next Tenn of the Supreme Court, criminal 
defense counsel discovered what Justice Scalia was hinting about in his 
dissent in Edmonson. In Georgia v. McCollum,149 the Supreme Court 
extended the Batson prohibitions to criminal defense attorneys exercis-
ing peremptory challenges. 150 
Relying on the perceived injury to the challenged juror, Justice 
B1ackmun wrote, "[r]egardless of who precipitated the jurors' removal, 
the perception and the reality in a criminal trial will be that the court 
has excused jurors based on race, an outcome that will be attributed to 
the State."151 Building on the reasoning of Justice Kennedy in 
Edmonson,152 Justice Blackmun suggested that defense counsel's par-
ticipation in race-based peremptory challenges would be unlawful. 153 
He said that "[d]efense counsel is limited to 'legitimate, lawful con-
duct.' It is an affront to justice to argue that a fair trial includes the 
right to discriminate against a group of citizens based upon their race.,,154 
the position that peremptory challenges constitute state action. See Katherine 
Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Sym-
metry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REv. 808, 808 (1989) (argu-
ing that Batson should not be extended to criminal defendants because it does not 
constitute state action and denies criminal defendants the widest possible latitude in 
jury selection). 
147. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
148. ld. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
149. 505 U.S. 42 (1992). 
150. See id. at 50-55. 
151. ld. at 53 (footnote omitted). 
152. See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text. 
153. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57. 
154. ld. (quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986)). One commentator 
has suggested that "the decision in McCollum may well have been influenced by the 
consequences of prohibiting only one side in a criminal case from using . . . peremp-
tory challenges." Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned 
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas prophesied "that 
black criminal defendants will rue the day that this Court ventured 
down this road that inexorably will lead to the elimination of perempto-
ry strikes."lss 
In 1993, the Court heard argument in a case that potentially would 
expand the Batson doctrine to all jury trial cases. In J.E.B. v. Alabama 
ex rei. T.B.,ls6 the Supreme Court held that intentional discrimination 
on the basis of gender by lawyers in exercising peremptory challenges 
in a civil case violated the Equal Protection Clause. ls7 The decision in 
J.E.B. finally closed the fences around the scope of the Batson doctrine. 
By collecting within the Batson rule the category of gender, any case 
would be ripe for a potential jury selection controversy. Because wom-
en encompass about one half of the nation's population,lss they are 
likely to be present in every jury panel from which petit juries are 
selected. In short, all cases may not have a black/white controversy 
lurking in jury selection, but all jurors belong to one gender or the 
other. 
In J.E.B., yet another opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Court con-
cluded that "[a]1I persons, when granted the opportunity to serve on a 
jury, have the right not to be excluded summarily because of discrimi-
natory and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and reinforce patterns 
of historical discrimination."ls9 
About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 454 n.57 
(1996). 
155. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 60 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
156. 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
157. See id. at 129. 
158. See id. at 142 n.13. The Supreme Court has in recent years recognized the 
need for protection of women's rights despite the fact that they are not a numerical 
minority. See id.; see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 4 U U.S. 677, 685-86 (1973). The 
Court has said that "the position of women in America has improved markedly in 
recent decades. Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that, in part because of [the] 
high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at times 
more subtle, discrimination." Id. (footnote omitted). 
159. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 141 (footnote omitted). It is an unassailable fact that 
women suffered considerable difficulty securing the right to vote, obtaining it 50 
years after emancipated black males. See generally Marina Angel, Criminal Law and 
Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills A Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate 
Trifles, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 229, 261-66 (1996) (discussing women obtaining the 
right to vote and to serve on juries). 
In 1873, Susan B. Anthony and 50 other women were tried in Rochester, New 
York, for trying to exercise their right to vote. See MIRIAM SCHNEIR, FEMINISM: THE 
ESSENTIAL HISTORICAL WRITINGS 133 (1972). 
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In this Alabama paternity case brought by the mother of a minor 
child, a jury trial was requested. 160 "The trial court assembled a panel 
of 36 potential jurors, 12 males and 24 females. After the court ex-
cused three jurors for cause, only 10 of the remaining 33 jurors were 
male.,,161 Of the remaining male jurors, the State struck ninety percent 
of them, or nine out of ten. 162 The petitioner objected to the all fe-
male jury that was to try his case. 163 
Justice Blackmun pointed out that "supporters of the exclusion of 
women from juries tended to couch their objections in terms of the 
ostensible need to protect women from the ugliness and depravity of 
trials. Women were thought to be too fragile and virginal to withstand 
the polluted courtroom atmosphere.,,164 
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed the view that race was 
different than gender. 165 He wrote that "[r]acial groups comprise nu-
merical minorities in our society, warranting in some situations a great-
Id. 
Anthony's defense was that the Fourteenth Amendment defined "citizen" as 
all persons born or naturalized in the United States, which made women 
eligible to vote. The judge would not allow Anthony to testify on her own 
behalf. Her attorney and district attorney presented five hours of argument, 
after which-without leaving the bench-the judge drew a previously prepared 
written opinion from his pocket and read it. He ruled that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was inapplicable and directed the all-male jury to bring in a 
guilty verdict. 
160. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. 
161. Id. 
162. See id. 
163. See id. Prior to l.E.B., some courts refused to extend the Batson doctrine to 
gender-based challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 217 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (refusing to extend Batson to gender-based challenges). Other courts have 
extended the equal protection rationale to gender-based peremptories. See, e.g., United 
States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990) (extending Batson to gen-
der-based challenges); State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849 (Haw. 1990) (extending 
Batson to prohibit gender-based challenges); Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 648, 649 (Md. 
1993) (extending Batson to gender-based challenges). 
164. l.E.B., 511 U.S. at 132. We should be reminded that stereotyped assumptions 
about women have even influenced our popular culture. The dialogue presented in 
Harper Lee's classic work, To Kill a Mockingbird, is an example. Lee's main charac-
ter, the ethical and well regarded lawyer, Atticus Finch, shared some of those notions. 
When asked by his son Jem, why women did not sit on juries, he said, '''I guess it's 
to protect our frail ladies from sordid cases like Tom's [a rape trial of a black man]. 
Besides,' Atticus grinned, 'I doubt if we'd ever get a complete case tried-':'the 
ladies'd be interrupting to ask questions.'" HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 
202 (1960). 
165. See l.E.B., 511 U.S. at 154 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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er need for protection, whereas the population is divided almost equally 
between meri and women. ,,166 
In a stinging dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia accused the majority 
of an effort "to pay conspicuous obeisance to the equality of the sex-
es.,,167 He warned that by doing so, "the Court imperils a practice that 
has been considered an essential part of ... the common law.,,168 He 
accused the majority of "vandalizing ... our people's traditions."169 
Justice Scalia's angry retort to the extension of Batson to gender-based 
challenges was not surprising considering his disagreement with the 
Court's earlier efforts to change the way peremptory challenges could 
be used by creating new constitutional rules. 
Justice Blackmun's blanket condemnation of race or gender-based 
decisions by lawyers, compared with the fervor of Justice Scalia's 
"hands off" approach,170 reached a bizarre climax the very next Term. 
The Court was poised to decide a case that would threaten to destroy 
the integrity of the work done by the Justices who had supported the 
Batson non-discrimination doctrine. 
In the case of Purkett v. Elem,171 the Court removed the need for 
lawyers to give plausible non-racial reasons for why they exercised their 
peremptory challenges. 172 The case came to the Supreme Court from a 
federal habeas corpus proceeding.173 The respondent was convicted of 
robbery in a Missouri trial court. 174 During jury selection, Elem 
lodged an objection to two blacks being struck from his jury.17S The 
166. ld. at 154-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). One critic of the JE.B. opInIon 
believes that it "is confusing because it supported the peremptory challenge yet pro-
vided reasons [to] justify its abolishment. ... However, in refusing to do so, the 
Court seems to have invalidated the peremptory challenge in practice." Christopher M. 
Ferdico, Note, The Death of the Peremptory Challenge: lE.B. v. Alabama, 28 
CREIGHTON L. REv. 1177, 1207 (1995) (footnotes omitted). 
167. JE.B., 511 U.S. at 163 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
168. ld. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Some images of women and their behavior are 
based on the notion that nature made men and women unalterably different. See. e.g., 
RUSH H. LIMBAUGH III, THE WAY THINGS OUGHT TO BE 194 (1992) ("[N]ature has 
defined behavioral roles for men and women. These roles are ordained in large part 
and not easily altered."). 
169. JE.B., 511 U.S. at 163 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
170. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. 
171. 514 U.S. 765 (1985) (per curiam). 
172. See id. at 768-70. 
173. See id. at 766-67. The Petitioner proceeded in the district court under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254. See id. at 766. 
174. See id. at 766. 
175. See id. 
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prosecutor explained his strike by stating that: 
"I struck [juror] number twenty-two because of his long hair. He 
had long curly hair. He had the longest hair of anybody on the panel 
by far. He appeared to not be a good juror for that fact, the fact that 
he had long hair hanging down shoulder length, curly, unkempt hair. 
Also, he had a mustache and a goatee type beard. And juror number 
twenty-four also has a mustache and goatee type beard. Those are the 
only two people on the jury ... with facial hair .... And 1 don't 
like the way they looked, with the way the hair is cut, both of them. 
And the mustaches and beards look suspicious to me.,,176 
The trial court overruled Elem's objection, and the Missouri Court of 
Appeals affirmed, "finding that the 'state's explanation constituted a 
legitimate "hunch"'l77 and that '[t]he circumstances fail [ed] to raise 
the necessary inference of racial discrimination. "'178 
The federal district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and 
recommendations concluding that the Missouri court's determination that 
"no purposeful discrimination was a factual finding entitled to a pre-
sumption of correctness."179 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that "'the prosecution must at 
least articulate some plausible race-neutral reason for believing that [sic] 
those factors will somehow affect the person's ability to perform his or 
her duties as a juror. '''180 The court "concluded that the 'prosecution's 
explanation for striking juror 22 ... was pretextual. ",181 Thus, it con-
cluded that the district court erred in not finding intentional discrimi-
nation. 182 
In rejecting this conclusion of the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that the explanation a prosecutor gives does not have to "be 
'related to the particular case to be tried"'183 or be ""'clear and rea-
sonably specific.""'184 The Court explained "[ w ]hat it mean[t] by a 
176. Id. 
177. Elem, 514 U.S. at 766 (quoting State v. Elem, 747 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1988». In other contexts the Supreme Court has rejected the use of hunches 
as a basis of constitutionally valid official conduct. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. I (1968) (recognizing that an inarticulate hunch is insufficient to justify a stop 
on the street by a police officer). 
178. Elem, 514 U.S. at 766 (quoting Elem, 747 S.W.2d at 775). 
179. Id. at 766-67. 
180. Id. at 767 (quoting Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 1994». 
181. Id. (quoting Elem, 25 F.3d at 684). 
182. See id. 
183. Id. at 768-69 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986) (footnote 
omitted». 
184. Elem, 514 U.S. at 768 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20 (quoting Texas 
372 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:343 
'legitimate reason' [a]s not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that 
does not deny equal protection."18s In effect, any non-racial reason, or 
presumably non-gender, would suffice. 
Two curious procedural aspects of Elem were the basis of controver-
sy. First, the Court's opinion was issued per curiam for what was a 
seven Justice majority. 186 This anonymous authorship was in stark 
contrast to the fervent partisan nature of earlier opinions in the Batson 
line of cases. 187 Secondly, the Court decided the case without the ben-
efit of full briefing and oral argument, a point that frustrated dissenting 
Justices Stevens and Breyer. 188 
Justice Stevens wrote "[i]n my opinion it is unwise for the Court to 
announce a law-changing decision without first ordering full briefing 
and argument on the merits of the case. The Court does this today 
when it overrules a portion of our opinion in Batson v. Kentucky." 189 
Justice Stevens characterized this action as the Court having "misused 
its summary reversal authority.,,190 
He decried what he believed was the majority's "unnecessary toler-
ance of silly, fantastic, and implausible explanations, together with its 
assumption that there is a difference of constitutional magnitude be-
tween a statement that 'I had a hunch about this juror based on his 
appearance,' and [the assertion that] 'I challenged this juror because he 
had a mustache. ",191 He was concerned that such distinctions "de-
mean[] the importance of the values vindicated by our decision in 
Batson.,,192 
Thus, the practical effect feared by the dissent is that whatever 
Batson stood for in terms of eliminating discrimination, it could now be 
easily ignored by prosecutors by offering any reason that was facially 
race or gender-neutral. As long as the reason is believed by the trial 
court judge, it would pass constitutional muster on appeal as a matter 
of law. Elem makes the reasons found valid at the trial level virtually 
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981»). 
185. /d. at 769 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20). 
186. /d. at 766. "Per curiam" is "[a] phrase used to distinguish an opinion of the 
whole court from an opinion written by anyone judge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
1136 (6th ed. 1990). 
187. The strongly held views by each of the Justices in the Batson series of cases 
makes the summary opinion in Elem particularly noteworthy. 
188. See Elem, 514 U.S. at 770 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
189. /d. (Stevens, 1., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
190. /d. at 770 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
191. /d. at 777-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
192. /d. at 778 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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unreviewable. 193 
The Elem opinion in many ways renders useless the ten years of 
Batson jury selection jurisprudence. For those who favored Batson, its 
prohibitions can be easily avoided by coming up with even implausible 
race-neutral reasons. 194 For those who feared the demise of peremptory 
challenges, Elem resurrects their power by reducing the scrutiny under 
which they would be examined for all lawyers desiring to use them. 
III. Acr II: THE TRAGEDY OF HONESTY 
Batson and its progeny promote dishonesty and encourage dishonesty to 
remain concealed, which undermines the ethical foundation of the legal 
profession. 
Much has been written about the low regard with which many 
members of the public have for lawyers. Although this fact has been 
the touchstone for much humor, 195 the lack of public confidence in 
the integrity of lawyers is no laughing matter. 
This is not a recent phenomenon. A public opinion poll taken in the 
early 1950s ranked lawyers behind teachers, clergy, politicians, and 
merchants in importance to the community.196 Certainly, the fact that 
lawyers spend a great deal of their time making representations on 
behalf of others and involving themselves in matters where people are 
required to trust them, may lead to a temptation to occasionally misrep-
resent. However, whatever the source of dishonesty, the fact remains 
that the harm to the reputation of the profession from the conduct of 
even one unscrupulous lawyer is substantial. 
In the context of the Batson problem, lawyer honesty is implicated 
193. See id. at 767-69. 
194. One public defender recently commented that the Purkett case 
"raises a burden that is relati~ely impossible to meet . . . . If the Court 
won't look at the plausibility of a race-neutral strike, then it sounds to me 
like I have to prove purposeful discrimination-what's in the prosecutor's 
mind. Unless you have a prosecutor who messes up badly, you're never 
going to get that kind of proof." 
Richard C. Reuben, Excuses, Excuses: Any Old Facially Neutral Reason May Be 
Enough to Defeat an Attack on a Peremptory Challenge, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 20, 
20 (quoting Gary Guichard, State Public Defender in Atlanta). 
195. See Lasson, supra note II, at 723-25 (collecting a number of popular lawyer 
jokes, many of which suggest the notion that they lack honesty and integrity). 
196. See Albert P. Blaustein, What Do Laymen Think of Lawyers? Polls Show the 
Need for Better Public Relations, 38 A.B.A. J. 39, 39 (1952). 
374 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:343 
because the rule of Batson requires a lawyer to give his reason, which 
compels a disclosure to the judicial tribunal. 191 Such an obligation is 
no casual event because the duty of disclosure requires "that a lawyer 
be absolutely honest with the court. Thus, a lawyer shall not knowing-
ly: make a false statement of'material fact or law to a tribunal.,,198 
In the midst of a Batson hearing, it must be remembered that sever-
al events that may reflect upon the honesty of a lawyer have already 
occurred. First, jurors have been challenged who belong to a protected 
group and a member of the Bar has objected, suggesting his opponent 
has behaved illegally. 199 Second, the number of those jurors chal-
lenged has been deemed by the judge sufficient to require the lawyer to 
respond directly to the court about whether they have done something 
that violates the law.20o When questioned, only two answers are avail-
able: I had an improper motivation in challenging the juror, or I did 
not. 
The rule of Batson creates a triggering mechanism that requires the 
judge to ask an officer of the court whether he has violated his obliga-
tion to be candid with the court. The ethical tragedy this creates is that 
being asked whether one has violated Batson is tantamount to an accu-
sation of dishonesty. 
It may be suggested that Batson held no such conclusion, rather, 
that it merely requires the judge to inquire into why a pattern of appar-
ent racial challenges has occurred.201 The problem with this conclu-
sion, however, is that if the lawyer offers no reason, he loses the hear-
ing because he is presumed to have acted improperly by failing to 
renounce that suggestion of his dishonesty.202 Thus, any answer, short 
197. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986). 
198. JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILIlY OF TIlE CRIMINAL 
LA WYER § 9.5, at 253 (1987) (footnotes omitted). 
199. In theory, even a single juror improperly challenged would be enough to 
violate Batson. 
200. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. 
201. See id. 
202. In a letter written in response to a confidential Maryland State Bar Associ-
ation survey, one jurist described the dilemma the Batson rule places on the judge 
presiding over a hearing: 
It seems every lawyer and judge can create the procedure they deem appro-
priate, and confusion and disorder lurk at the threshold of each case. For 
instance, do you first find out from the prospective juror what his/her pedi-
gree is? (Obviously, this puts the judge in the position of appearing to be 
biased by asking). Do you then ask the attorney why he or she exercised a 
peremptory against this particular juror? And then, by some unknown stan-
dard, decide whether or not you believe the attorney's stated reason is bona 
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of admitting that you tried to make an illegal challenge, is better than 
no answer at al1.203 
A by-product of such a rule is the problem it creates for a lawyer 
who fears that his answer, based on intuition or a hunch, may not be 
believed by the judge. No lawyer wants a judge to disbelieve him; thus, 
creation of a more plausible answer becomes the convenient solution. 
Some lawyers may justify such a reaction by hiding behind their obli-
gation to represent their client "zealously.»204 Others may simply con-
vince themselves that the better Batson answer is the actual reason that 
they challenged the juror. Such a rationale raises even more challenging 
ethical questions: 
A lawyer has a duty to be honest with himself or herself. . . . 
This duty, however, goes beyond the law. Any lawyer who can lie 
to himself that what he is doing for a client is right and just when it 
really is not will devalue his worth to himself and become a mere 
prostitute for the client. Ultimately, this course has to pervert or deval-
ue the lawyer's own sense of values.20s 
The more that the lawyer believes that he can avoid being labeled a 
racist, sexist, or liar by a quickly formulated neutral reason, the more 
he is likely to repeat the process should the matter come up again. 
fide? If one decides it isn't, does the judge then infer that some other moti-
vation exists, and in effect accuse the attorney of lying? This is an inauspi-
cious way to start a trial and sows the seeds for mistrial and recusal motions 
before the trial even starts. 
Letter from an anonymous jurist, to the Maryland State Bar Association (June 30, 
1995) (on file with author, Maryland State Bar Association Section on Criminal Law 
and Practice, and the New England Law ReView). 
203. Some jurists believe that Batson does have a deterrent affect on prosecutors 
who might attempt to strike minority jurors. In response to a judicial survey, another 
trial judge commented "that prosecutors have bent over backwards not to place them-
selves in a Batson-risky situation, and thus will exercise a challenge to an African-
American juror only if they have a well-thought-out reason for doing so." Letter from 
an anonymous jurist, to the Maryland State Bar Association (June 9, 1995) (on file 
with author, the Maryland State Bar Association Section on Criminal Law and Prac-
tice, and the New England Law Review). 
204. Gerald F. Uelmen, Lord Brougham's Bromide: Good Lawyers as Bad Citizens, 
30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 119, 122 (1996) ("The premise of the adversary system is that 
the goal of fair adjudication is more likely to be served if lawyers function as zeal-
ous advocates for their clients and leave judgments about what is good for the 
'system' for another time and place."); see also Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: 
The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, \066-67 
(1976) (arguing that lawyers have a special relationship and obligation to protect indi-
vidual autonomy within the law). 
205. HALL, supra note 198, § 9.7, at 256 (footnote omitted). 
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A judge may also become a participant in the charade that encour-
ages lawyers to offer better neutral reasons for excluding jurors. A 
judge certainly does not take comfort in having his courtroom become a 
battleground for accusations between lawyers alleging illegal conduct; 
thus, there is likely a temptation to identify a lawyer as having violated 
Batson only as a last resort. 206 Thus, the reluctance on the part of 
judges to find a Batson violation fuels the practice of offering fabricat-
ed reasons that relieves the judge of the need to implicitly call an offi-
cer of the court a liar by ruling to reject his reason. 
In my view, this creates a system that, through the structure of its 
accusatory process/07 encourages lawyers to lie. They are rewarded 
for effective fabrication by the judge who would rather believe that the 
lawyer in question is obeying his oath. Such a system is morally unjus-
tifiable, but easily understood. It is supported by law that makes it 
more convenient to ignore these moral questions than to police them. 
Professor William Simon recently discussed why laws go unenforced. 
He said: 
Many laws are unenforced or underenforced because people disobey 
them and officials are unable or unwilling to sanction them. With some 
laws, this fact is a tragedy that reflects the inadequate socialization of 
the actors and practical difficulties of enforcement. With others, howev-
er, it seems a largely desirable mode of accommodating formal law to 
practical circumstances. In these situations, citizens often violate the 
laws without any sense of wrongdoing, and their actions are ratified by 
officials who decline to sanction them even when they have the ability 
to do 50.208 
Professor Simon's observations are a persuasive description of what 
I believe takes place in the post-Batson courtroom during jury selection. 
Since a judge can no better search the heart of a lawyer for truth than 
a witness in a case, his ability to enforce Batson is limited by his de-
206. At least one detailed statistical analysis has demonstrated that neutral explana-
tions are accepted by trial courts in "almost four out of five situations." Melilli, su-
pra note 154, at 465. This high frequency of acceptable explanations could indicate 
that judges are likely to find most any reason acceptable rather than to rule, in ef-
fect, that a lawyer has attempted to mislead them. 
207. One might ponder if a lawyer caught red handed attempting to exercise pe-
remptory challenges against black or women jurors, could even invoke the Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent, rather than fabricate an alternative reason for the 
challenge. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 
427-34 (1971) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion) (suggesting that some statements taken 
for administrative purposes may not be subject to Fifth Amendment privilege). 
208. William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 217, 233 (1996). 
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sire to avoid stigmatizing a lawyer as untruthful. 
This problem may be particularly difficult to solve if the challenge 
is made between lawyers who must practice against each other on a 
regular basis. The accusatory procedure of Batson is likely to lead to 
hard feelings and an uncomfortable courtroom working environment.209 
F or the lawyer who does not regularly practice before a given court, 
the risk of making a Batson challenge may be to anger the judge by 
challenging the integrity of a local lawyer with whom the judge has 
become familiar and who he may believe to be honest. Developing such 
a negative relationship with a judge at the beginning of a case may 
certainly be detrimental to one's client. Thus, making a Batson chal-
lenge may bring extreme disfavor because, beneath it all, everyone 
involved knows that it is a pointless exercise if the judge is not in-
clined to bring a lawyer's personal integrity into question. 
What is particularly disturbing is that the Elem case,2lO the most 
recent of the Supreme Court's Batson progeny, may have made it im-
possible to solve this ethical tragedy. By permitting virtually any race 
or gender-neutral reason to satisfy the explanation requirement/II the 
Supreme Court has placed unreviewable power in the hands of trial 
judges, who have little incentive to use it against lawyers who regularly 
practice before them. Thus, the ethics of both lawyers and judges are 
called into question because the law makes it easier for lawyers to lie 
and makes it easier for judges to ignore it when they do. 
Honesty is an important value in a lawyer's professional responsi-
bility and for society in general.212 
To be honest is to be real, genuine, authentic, and bona fide. To be 
dishonest is to be partly feigned, forged, fake, or fictitious. Honesty 
expresses both self-respect and respect for others. . . . Honesty imbues 
lives with openness, reliability, and candor; it expresses a disposition to 
live in the light. Dishonesty seeks shade, cover, or concealment. It is a 
disposition to live partly in the dark. ... Lying is an "easy" tool of 
concealment, and when often employed, all too easily hardens into a 
malignant vice.213 
When dishonesty becomes too convenient, it becomes like a game of 
209. See supra note 202. 
210. See supra notes I 71-94 and accompanying text. 
211. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768-69 (1995) (per curiam). 
212. Honesty is a primary value that a lawyer should possess. Without it all other 
matters in the lawyer's world are likely to fall below professional standards. 
213. WILLIAM J. BENNElT, THE BOOK OF VIRTIJES: A TREASURY OF GREAT MOR-
AL STORIES 599 (1993). 
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'''[c]atch me if you can!",214 Thus, there is a danger that the untruth-
ful behavior will become institutionalized. 
The legal profession is already confronting problems of institutional 
dishonesty that are shaped even from the beginning of legal training. A 
recent article in the National Jurist Magazine serves as an instructive 
example of how dishonesty in the profession becomes entrenched in 
routine conduct.215 The article, which was based on a law student sur-
vey, noted that "[f]ifty-four percent of respondents [to the survey] said 
they have cheated in some way while in law school, including plagia-
rizing, copying other students' homework, using forbidden materials 
during exams, and inflating their achievements on their resumes.,,216 
Not unpredictably, the reasons that law school cheating goes unde-
tected and unreported are similar to why Batson violations are so diffi-
cult to police. "For starters, lots of cheating may go unreported, even 
though many law schools have honor codes that require students to 
report any offenses they know about.,,217 This failure to report cheat-
ing is often attributed to peer pressure and the "'fear of being labeled a 
snitch."'218 Lawyers and judges in a community do not want to be-
lieve that there are liars in the ranks, therefore, peer pressure may en-
courage even diligent lawyers to abandon legitimate Batson objections. 
Secondly, students who accuse others of cheating have the "'respon-
sibility to substantiate the charge. ",219 This is extremely difficult un-
less the student is '''caught red-handed. ",220 Similarly, in a Batson 
hearing, the objecting party has the burden of establishing that the pat-
tern of strikes indicates discrimination. Thus, for a lawyer to realistical-
ly succeed in a Batson hearing, the number of black or women jurors 
challenged would have to be unusually high. In either circumstance, the 
ease and frequency with which cheating occurs tarnishes the profession. 
As one lawyer has observed, "'[c]heating, like all scandals, blackens the 
eye of the profession, and our profession has enough black eyes. ",221 
214. Id. at 600. 
215. See Soozhana Choi, How Many of Your Classmates Cheat?, THE NAT'L Ju-
RJST, Nov.lDec. 1996, at 14. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 18. 
218. Id. (quoting Dana Gottlieb, Third Year Law Student, St. Thomas University 
School of Law). 
219. Id. (quoting Frank Real, Assistant Dean for Student Services, Santa Clara 
University School of Law). 
220. Id. (quoting Frank Real, Assistant Dean for Student Services, Santa Clara 
University School of Law). 
221. Choi, supra note 215, at 20 (quoting John Held, Recruiting Partner, 
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When dishonesty becomes so pervasive that it is considered normal, 
something needs to change. If deception becomes the manner in which 
the law encourages efficiency, the profession fails. 
IV. ACT III: THE TRAGEDY OF COMPETENCE 
Modern jury selection approaches may well be illegal under Batson, 
since lawyers still openly rely on instinct, experience, and science 
which all depend, in some degree, on assumptions about race and gen-
der. 
In order to understand how lawyers are affected by the changes in 
the law brought about by the Batson line of cases, one must first look 
at what lawyers actually believed about jury selection and peremptory 
challenges before the rules were altered. During the 1960s, the noted 
trial lawyer Louis Nizer described the lawyer's job of selecting a jury 
to be a composite of hunch, instinct, and experience.222 He wrote that 
"[ w ]hen a lawyer selects jurors, he scans their faces, evaluates their 
voices, appraises their diction, observes their clothes, senses their empa-
thy, weighs their mannerisms, all to determine whether they will be 
favorably inclined to his client and cause. He does not seek mere ob-
jectivity. ,>223 
In this context, he describes the lawyer's role as an advocate, at-
tempting to maximize the jury selection process in favor of his client as 
much as possible.224 Nizer explains that the selection process itself 
carried certain protections at the time before Batson, when he prac-
ticed.225 "Since each side selects those who have most favorable predi-
lection to it, an average impartiality is thereby approximated. This is 
the law's device to avoid prejudice."226 
McAndrews, Held & Malloy in Chicago). 
222. See LOUIS NIZER, THE JURY RETURNS 295 (1966). 
223. Id. 
224. See id. 
225. See id. 
226. Id. Other lawyers concur with Nizer's assessment. For example, the 
flamboyant William Kunstler once wrote: 
an impartial jury is a myth. Each side in a Uury] trial wants jurors it be-
lieves will be sympathetic to it, so lawyers deliberately set out to select spe-
cific jurors. I base my choices largely on intuition and instinct, always hop-
ing the ones I select have fewer basic antagonisms and will therefore be 
more likely to vote for acquittal. 
WILLIAM M. KUNS11..ER WIlli SHEILA ISENBERG, My LIFE AS A RADICAL LAWYER 
287 (1994). 
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At the core of the Batson dispute is the use of racial stereotyping in 
making jury selection decisions. Most of the controversy over whether 
the inquiry rule of Batson was needed, was the action of prosecutors 
striking blacks from juries,227 believing that they were either unfit to 
serve because of their race or too likely to favor acquittal of a black 
defendant. 228 
At the outset, it should be recognized that whatever value racial 
stereotyping has in jury selection, it is no panacea for success. One 
danger of racial stereotyping is that those who engage in it may place 
too much confidence in its accuracy. All blacks and all whites do not 
necessarily think alike. As noted Harvard scholar Cornel West has ob-
served, "[ e ]very claim to racial authenticity presupposes elaborate con-
ceptions of political and ethical relations of interests, individuals, and 
communities. Racial reasoning conceals these presuppositions behind a 
deceptive cloak of racial consensus.,,229 Professor West cautions that 
any attempt to confine blacks, for example, within a single ideology 
should be viewed with "suspicion. ,,230 
227. See supra note 7. 
228. Fonner Philadelphia Chief Prosecutor, Jack McMahon, in a highly publicized 
training tape on jury challenges, stated: 
"The blacks from the low-income areas are less likely to con-
vict. ... In selecting blacks, you don't want the real educated 
ones .... [And], young black women are very bad. There's an antagonism. 
I guess maybe because they're downtrodden in two respects. They are women 
and they're black ... so they somehow want to take it out on somebody 
and you don't want it to be you." 
L. Stuart Ditzen et aI., Avoid Poor Black Jurors. McMahon Said, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
Apr. I, 1997, at AI. 
McMahon justified his suggested actions by saying "it may appear as if you're 
being racist, but again, you're just being realistic. You're just trying to win the case. 
The other side is doing the same thing." ld. Obviously, his assumptions about good 
jurors are replete with racial conclusions and stereotypes, improper under Batson, but 
at least in his opinion, constitutes effective advocacy to obtain a conviction or avoid 
an acquittal. 
229. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 26 (1993). 
230. ld. Despite the lack of definitive proof that racial assumptions are the best 
predictor of jury behavior, conscious racial choices are still made at trials. In the 
celebrated Mayor Marion Barry drug and conspiracy trial, race played out as an im-
portant factor in jury selection for both sides. See JONAlHAN I.Z. AGRONSKY, 
MARION BARRY: THE POLITICS OF RACE 230-31 (1991). The government, with its 
available challenges, used "seven of their nine pennitted strikes to dismiss blacks they 
thought would be sympathetic to the mayor [a black man]. . . . [B]y contrast, 
[Barry's lawyers] used all but two of their 12 strikes to exclude white Uurors] they 
thought might vote to convict their client." ld. 
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Despite the Supreme Court's attempts to remove consideration of 
race from jury selection, there has been a long tradition of using physi-
cal characteristics as a proxy for behavior. Professor Paula Johnson 
reminds us that: 
For centuries, theorists have propounded genetic detenninism as the 
justification for ranking people on the basis of class, race, ethnicity, 
and gender, and for providing differential access to societal resourc-
es. . . . Eighteenth and nineteenth century biological definitions of race 
subdivided people into three basic classifications: Negroid (Black), 
Caucasian (White), and Mongoloid (Yellow) .... The postulate of 
biological detenninism equated racial differences with innate inferiority. 
Consequently, the biological system of ranking the races institutional-
ized the bases upon which societal benefits and burdens were to be 
distributed.231 
The debate still rages as to whether these assumptions based on 
physical characteristics have any validity.232 The focus on race and 
behavior has been joined with the controversial concept of racial jury 
nullification.2J3 This concept has gained a great deal of attention in 
Such behavior on the part of lawyers would seem to support former prosector 
McMahon's notion that each side is trying to challenge jurors based on racial as-
sumptions. See supra note 228. 
The Bernhard Goetz subway shooting case in New York involved a shooting by 
a white man of several black men who Goetz maintained approached him in a threat-
ening manner on the subway. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 43-44 (N.Y. 
1986). In this case, race was considered a significant factor in the jury selection 
strategy. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ 
AND mE LAW ON TRJAL 88 (1988). The prosecutor needed jurors sympathetic to the 
black victims who may have been approaching Goetz for questionable reasons. See id. 
"[H]e would prefer, as he put it, left-leaning 'Greenwich village types,' people who 
would appreciate the public danger generated by armed gunmen stalking the subways. 
Id. 
231. Paula C. Johnson, The Social Construction of Identity in Criminal Cases: 
Cinema Verite and the Pedagogy of Vincent Chin, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 347, 355-
56 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 
232. Compare James Shreeve, Terms of Estrangement, DISCOVER, Nov. 1994, at 56, 
56-63 (discussing how the question of race persists in scientific research) with Juan 
Williams, Violence. Genes. and Prejudice, DISCOVER, Nov. 1994, at 92, 92-102 (dis-
cussing the consequences of the debate suggesting that an inclination towards violence 
can be linked to race). 
233. Racial jury nullification refers to the notion that juries will be less likely to 
convict someone of their own race in some cases, even if the evidence strongly sug-
gests that they are guilty. Although racially motivated jury nullification has received a 
great deal of attention recently, the phenomenon is not limited to that circumstance. 
See generally Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience 
of Jury Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165 (1991) (advocating instructions 
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several high publicity jury trials like the Mayor Marion Barry trial,234 
the Rodney King police beating trial,235 and, of course, the infamous 
O.J. Simps~m case.236 These cases focused new attention on how race 
plays a role in jury behavior, resulted in skepticism about the jury sys-
tem,237 and led to calls for reform.238 
The controversial scholarship of Professor Paul Butler,239 who has 
called for juries in black communities to acquit black defendants In 
some non-violent drug crimes,240 brought a great deal of criticism to 
him.241 However, it also focused the national debate on the reality of 
to a jut)' on its power to nUllify a verdict). 
234. See generally Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System's 
Diffirent Voice, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1377 (1994) (discussing the acquittal of District 
of Columbia Mayor Marion Barty of drug charges, on evidence many believed was 
overwhelming, indicating that jut)' nullification may have taken place). 
235. See Seth Mydans, Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in Taped Beating, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at AI, 022 (reporting the acquittal and subsequent rioting after 
the controversial verdict rendered by an all white jut)'). See generally STACY C. 
KOON & ROBERT DEITZ, PREsUMED GUILTY: THE TRAGEDY OF THE RODNEY KING 
AFFAIR (1992) (discussing the King case from the point of view of one of the offi-
cers involved). 
236. See George Anastaplo, On Crime. Criminal Lawyers. and OJ. Simpson: 
Plato's Gorgias Revisited, 26 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 455, 466 n.26 (1995) (discussing the 
Simpson case and "deep-seated re'servations that African-Americans have about the 
criminal justice system"). 
237. Recent polls reveal that whites and blacks have different attitudes about the 
fairness of the jut)' system, particularly after the OJ. Simpson criminal verdict. See 
Joe Urschel, Poll: A Nation More Divided, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 1995, at 5A. 
238. Some advocates of reform have suggested major renovation of the jut)' system 
because of the "benign neglect[,] . . . malignant hostilityL] . . . cynical manipulation 
and strategic perversion" that the jut)' system has suffered. Akhil Reed Amar, Rein-
venting Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1169, 1169 (1995) 
(discussing several proposed major reforms to the jut)' system). 
239. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Crimi-
nal Justice System, 105 YALE LJ. 677, 678 (1995) (arguing that it is sometimes le-
gally and morally appropriate for black jurors to refuse to convict certain black de-
fendants). 
240. See id. at 679. Professor Butler suggests that "the black community is better 
off when some nonviolent lawbreakers remain in the community rather than go to 
prison." [d. 
241. In passionate rejection of Professor Butler's endorsement of intentional jut)' 
nullification for some crimes, Professor Randall Kennedy observes that "although 
[professor Butler's views are] animated by a desire to challenge racial injustice [his 
proposal] would demolish the moral framework upon which an effective, attractive, 
and compelling alternative can and must be built." RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, 
AND LAW 3 10 (1997). Professor Kennedy makes a detailed argument critical of Pro-
fessor Butler's suggestions. See id. at 295-310. 
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race conscious jury behavior. The principle of jury nullification is not a 
new concept,242 but Batson has presented new challenges in consider-
ing the role nullification should play in the criminal justice system. The 
seemingly irreconcilable contradiction that race should not be a factor in 
selecting juries, while at the same time lawyers and psychologists utiliz-
ing race as a primary decision making factor, has caused criticism of 
the jury system to become severe.243 Thus, differences among the rac-
es in the perception of '~ury justice" has been further exposed.244 
In JE.B., Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, made it unmis-
takably clear that race or gender-based exclusion of jurors was ille-
gal.24S If this is true, why is it not illegal to hire a jury consultant 
who will take into account the race and gender of the jurors?246 Why 
242. The concept of jury nullification is not new. Indeed, the practice pre-dates the 
Declaration of Independence. See Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1006-07 (C.P. 
1670) (discussing that at the trial of Quaker activists William Penn and William 
Mead, who were charged with unlawful assembly, the jurors refused to convict, de-
spite strong evidence and the fact that the jurors were refused food and drink). 
243. One critic of the suggestion of race conscious jury behavior has called "Pro-
fessor Butler's proposal .•. foolish and dangerous." Andrew D. Leipold, The Dan-
gers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response to Profossor Butler, 44 UCLA L. 
REv. 109, III (1996). 
244. See supra note 237. 
245. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rei. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994); see also supra 
text accompanying note 170. 
246. Jury consultants often use surveys which directly seek information that will 
assist parties in excluding jurors based on racial or gender issues and attitudes. A 
good example of such a survey is the massive jury consultant questionnaire used by 
the O.J. Simpson defense team. Among the questions asked in the 294 item survey 
related to gender; "164. Have you or has someone you know had any contact with a 
family violence program, a battered women's shelter, or attended any programs con-
cerning family or domestic violence? Yes? No? If yes, who was involved. Please 
explain the circumstances." Survey from OJ. Simpson's Defense Team to Jurors (Oct. 
3, 1994) (on file with author and the New England Law Review). 
ple: 
On the matter of race, the survey questions were even more direct. For exam-
182. How big a problem do you think racial discrimination against African-
Americans is in Southern California? A very serious problem? A somewhat 
serious problem? Not too serious? Not at all serious? Not a problem? 
188. "Some races and-or ethnic groups tend to be more violent than others." 
Strongly agree? Agree? Disagree? Strongly disagree? No opinion? If you wish 
to do so, please explain your answer: 
191. When you were growing up, what was the racial and ethnic make-up of 
your neighborhood? 
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is it not illegal to ask voir dire questions about racial attitudes or 
women's issues?247 Considering race and gender in excluding jurors 
seems to be established by both tradition248 and science249 and is a 
matter of serious consideration for a trial practitioner seeking to be 
com petent. 250 
I would submit that under the Batson doctrine, hiring a jury consul-
tant and discussing the racial and gender composition of a jury in a 
particular case might well constitute the crime of conspiracy to violate 
the equal protection rights of potential prospective jurors.2S1 The ac-
Id. 
192. Is there any racial or ethnic group you do not feel comfortable being 
around? Yes? No? If yes, please explain. 
Such direct references to gender and race leaves little doubt that the focus of 
the Simpson jury selection took into account these allegedly impermissible factors. 
247. See supra note 246. 
248. The use of jury consultants and their demographic and psychological tools 
have been developed to assist lawyers in selecting better juries. See LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 397 n.· (1993) ("The 
object is not to ensure fairness, but to replace the lawyers' hunches and rules of 
thumb about good jurors and bad jurors . . . with something more solidly grounded. 
The process is extremely expensive; consequently, it is used only in very special 
cases. Whether it works or not has never satisfactorily been proven."). Prior to the 
scientific approach, lawyers used experience, tradition, or folklore to decide who 
should be on a jury in any given case. See id. at 243-44. 
249. Scientific jury selection techniques have become a fixture in American court-
rooms in high profile cases. Some observers believe, however, that it has not been 
good for the perception of fairness in the justice system held by the public. See 
JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE TIlE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND mE IDEAL OF DEMOC-
RACY 176 (1994) ("Scientific jury selection grew out of, and in tum pushed further, 
the prevailing skepticism about juries as impartial institutions of justice."). 
250. The Sixth Amendment provides the right of an accused "to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Court has determined 
that such assistance must be reasonably effective. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-97 (1984). Accordingly, the need to be competent logically extends to 
a lawyer's role in jury selection. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stitzel, 454 A.2d 1072, 
1075-76 (Pa. 1982) (holding that the failure to exercise a peremptory challenge to 
remove a potentially prejudicial juror can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). 
Even the American Bar Association has recognized that seeking a jury consul-
tant may be required if a lawyer is to provide competent representation. In the con-
text of a death penalty case, one ABA report has advised that such consultants can 
help determine what "invisible but lethal [amounts] of prejudice may exist in the jury 
pool." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR TIlE APPOINlMENT AND PER-
FORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEA m PENALTY CASES 117 (1989). The report concluded 
consideration of "sociological data, psychological expertise," and "intuition" may be 
useful. Id. Ironically, these are the very factors which Batson and its progeny have 
called into question. 
251. Conspiracy, which is a crime in all jurisdictions, has been defined as: 
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tions of the legal defense team would also seem to violate various civil 
rights laws that have long been in place to protect against attempts to 
violate a citizen's constitutional rights.252 
It may be suggested that in the representation of the client such 
discussions might be protected by various privileges attached to lawyer 
confidentiality.2SJ However, since consideration of race has been 
deemed illegal by the Supreme Court, how could it be shielded by a 
mere evidentiary privilege? It is well settled that such protections do 
not operate when illegal conduct is taking place.2s4 
A combination or confederacy between two or more persons formed for the 
purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, some unlawful or criminal act, 
or some act which is lawful in itself, but becomes unlawful when done by 
the concerted action of the conspirators, or for the purpose of using criminal 
or unlawful means to the commission of an act not in itself unlawful. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 309 (6th ed. 1990). 
Although planning for jury selection is not illegal, discussing how to challenge 
jurors based on race or gender, while at the same time developing neutral reasons to 
mask those intentions, would seem to be using unlawful means to accomplish an act 
Gury selection) which is not "in itself unlawful." ld. 
252. An attorney may well be in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242, a criminal statute, 
which provides in pertinent part that: 
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected 
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, 
pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by rea-
son of his color, or race, . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or im-
prisoned not more than one year, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994). 
It would also appear that the defense team advising the defendant may be in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil statute, which provides that deprivation of a 
constitutional right under color of law, shall make a person "liable to the party in-
jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 
Thus, an attorney attempting to remove blacks or women from a jury and seek-
ing a jury consultant's advice on how to remove them, would be depriving them of 
the right to serve on a jury. Since the Supreme Court has deemed the jury selection 
process a public matter, see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618-
28 (1991); see also supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text, the defense team 
would be acting under "color of law" as the statutes prohibit. 18 U.S.C. § 242 
(1994); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 
253. Attorney client privilege will not shield a lawyer who attempts to conspire to 
commit perjury. See, e.g., United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960). 
254. There has long been an exception to the confidentiality rules for lawyers who 
plan or engage in future crimes and frauds. See JOHN WESLEY HALL, PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF mE CRIMINAL LAWYER 882 (2d ed. 1996). 
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The current state of the law would appear to make consulting such 
professionals a serious ethical problem.255 There has been little atten-
tion focused on this concern as far as I have been able to deter-
mine.256 Is this because no bar disciplinary counsel will seriously con-
sider an inquiry against an attorney who diligently seeks to prepare his 
case by empaneling the best jury possible, racial and gender consider-
ations notwithstanding? Is it because government prosecutors do not 
believe that discrimination of lawyers against "challenged jurors" is not 
a major civil rights priority?257 Perhaps it is because no one, including 
the Supreme Court, contemplated that the Batson rules were intended to 
operate to keep lawyers from trying to prepare their jury selection as 
they had always prepared. 
The problem is that the rules have changed, but the conduct of 
lawyers has not; yet another ethical tragedy. No one appears to believe 
that preparing for trial with a jury consultant is the same as illegally 
conspiring to select jurors based on race or gender. Until someone 
sanctions the lawyers, they will not and indeed might believe that they 
cannot stop using the tools that their professional judgment suggests 
might actually help their clients.258 Even those lawyers who are not 
255. One scholar has even suggested that the ethical problem is equally unavoid-
able for the jury consultant. See FRANKLIN STRIER, REcONSlRUCTING JUSTICE: AN 
AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM 139 (1994). 
An ethical issue for social scientists retained by trial counsel persists. 
Social scientists who participate in the adversarial attempt to obtain favorable 
jurors tarnish the image of their profession. Serving in this capacity, the paid 
expert should have no false illusions; no one wants to hire an "ivory tower" 
consultant to assist in selecting a "fair and impartial" jury .... The goal is 
to maximize the number of favorably biased jurors. Consultants who facilitate 
this must appreciate that their efforts contribute to an end of questionable 
propriety. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
256. There has been little scholarship on the subject of the ethics of lawyers using 
jury selection professionals to help select juries in racially or gender laden cases. In 
other contexts, however, lawyers have been subject to criminal "prosecution for con-
duct that exceeds the proper bounds of zealous representation and violates the crimi-
nal law, such as counseling clients to destroy evidence or jury tampering." Nathan M. 
Crystal, Limitations on Zealous Representation in an Adversarial System, 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REv. 671, 676 (1997) (footnotes omitted) (discussing judicial and disciplin-
ary remedies against overzealous advocates). 
257. One would wonder what type of jury a federal civil rights prosecutor would 
attempt to impanel to try such a case. Would he take race or gender into account? 
Let us hope he would at least resist the urge to hire a jury consultant for this par-
ticular trial. 
258. The modem criminal trial features jury consultants in increasing numbers. In 
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able to use consultants often ask voir dire questions that contemplate 
racial or gender consideration. It is also obvious that lawyers will use 
their eyes to identify the race or gender of jurors and their instinct and 
experience to select those believed to be best suited to the case. If race 
or gender has been used during this process, often, it is known only to 
the lawyer.259 
It is clear that we must establish jury selection rules that will not 
create a situation where a lawyer, using jury consultants, is either 
breaking the law or, by failing to use one, is committing malprac-
tice.260 Accordingly, the Batson doctrine again creates a problem 
which has all the charm of the riddle of "Rumpelstiltskin. ,,261 
V. ACT IV: THE TRAGEDY OF THE ACCUSED 
A criminal defendant, who has the greatest stake in the outcome of his 
trial, may have not only lost the unfettered right to peremptory chal-
lenges, but also. the ability to meaningfully consult his lawyer about his 
personal preferences in shaping his jury. 
the OJ. Simpson case, both the prosecution and defense had jury consultants avail-
able. See Mark Miller, The Road to Panama City: How a Jury Consultant Got OJ. 
Back on the First Tee, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1995, at 84. Because of the success of 
Simpson's defense, which resulted in an acquittal of all charges, the demand for his 
consultant's services has increased. See id. But even Ms. Jo-Ellan Dimitrius, jury con-
sultant for OJ. Simpson's defense team, recognized that her role in the case was not 
necessarily well thought of by the public. '''Unfortunately, ... what we do is viewed 
as suspect by people-always has been, always will be. '" ld. 
259. Some lawyers have suggested that not only should a competent attorney con-
sider playing to the perceived racial prejudice of a jury, but that sound advocacy of-
ten requires such efforts. One lawyer training manual suggests that during opening 
argument "in addition to all else, [the lawyer] must have a clear perception of the 
convictions, the sentiments and firmly rooted prejudices of the twelve men in the 
box." LLOYD PAUL STRYKER, THE ART OF ADVOCACY: A PLEA FOR TIlE RENAIS-
SANCE OF TIlE TRiAL LAWYER 58 (1954). 
260. See supra note 250. There is reason to believe that the use of jury consul-
tants will continue. In 1991, for example, lawyers paid $200 million for consulting 
services. See Debra Sahler, Comment, Scientifically Selecting Jurors While Maintaining 
ProfeSSional Responsibility: A Proposed Model Rule, 6 ALB. LJ. SCI. & TECH. 383, 
402 (1996). Sahler suggests that the profession's use of consultants supports the no-
tion that many lawyers believe scientific jury selection is superior to the use of tradi-
tional theories and stereotypes. See id. at 402-03. 
261. THE COMPLETE GRIMM'S FAIRY TALES 264 (Joseph Campbell ed., 1944). In 
this Brother's Grimm fairy tale, the obligation of a young woman to the mystical elf 
Rumpelstiltskin, to surrender her first born child, could not be satisfied until she 
could answer a nearly impossible riddle, to guess his name. See id. at 266. She ulti-
mately solved the riddle, but only by accidently overhearing the answer. See id. at 
267-68. 
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The problem of whether it is appropriate to take into account race 
and gender as part of a jury selection strategy is further complicated if 
a defendant may wish to play in the selection of his own jury. Consid-
er the following hypothetical scenario that might occur: 
A white criminal defendant is charged with a racial hate crime 
against a black woman who was assaulted as she attempted to enter her 
vehicle leaving a shopping mall. The victim was beaten badly and her 
vehicle was spray painted with racial slurs. You represent the defendant 
who is accused of the crime. He states that he was not even near the 
scene. He is, however, fearful that women or blacks on the jury will 
lead to his conviction. He asks you to remove as many of them as 
possible during the jury selection. 
What is an appropriate ethical response to his request under Batson? 
It appears that you must tell him that you cannot take race and gender 
into account when you use your peremptory challenges.262 If you hire 
a jury consultant and your consultant suggests that your client's fears 
are well taken, do you ignore her advice? When you actually begin to 
strike jurors, do you put your client's wishes out of your mind? How 
do you avoid being placed in this uncomfortable position? Perhaps the 
only alternative a lawyer may have in a case that he knows has racially 
or gender charged facts, is to explain to the client the rules of Batson 
and that in order for the lawyer to select the best jury possible, the 
client simply cannot offer his opinions on the composition of the jury. 
How should a lawyer respond to the client's wishes in such a situa-
tion? Obviously, the law contemplates that the defendant participate 
with his lawyer in the jury selection process.263 A defendant, in most 
circumstances, cannot even abandon his right to a jury trial without 
taking affirmative steps to do SO.264 Furthermore, the failure of a law-
yer to discuss the selection of the jury with his client may lead to a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 265 
It is realistic to conclude that most defendants will ultimately base 
their opinion of their lawyer on the result rendered by the jury.266 
Thus, if the client's input is not considered, confidence in the quality of 
the legal representation will also be diminished.267 Even in a world 
262. See supra text accompanying note 170. 
263. See Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 258-59 (1993). 
264. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
265. See supra note 250. 
266. See supra note 13. 
267. The confidence a client has in his lawyer is closely linked to the perception 
that the lawyer will, in some measure, advance the client's own interests. See Michael 
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where scientific jury selection is available, the client's opinion about 
which jurors should sit and which should not, will affect the client's 
attitude about the fairness of the proceedings against him. 
Obviously, clients do not always agree with their attorneys on the 
jury selection decisions that should be made. An interesting example of 
such disagreement can be found in the chronicle of the case of United 
States v. MacDonald/68 the so called "fatal vision" case.269 The 
prosecution centered around the actions of a military physician, Doctor 
Jeffrey MacDonald, who was accu'sed of killing his wife and children in 
a series of brutal stabbings in the family home.27o 
The defense hired a jury consultant to create a profile of the jury 
most favorably disposed to MacDonald's case.271 A demographic anal-
ysis revealed "that the ideal jury would be composed mainly of conser-
vative whites over the age of thirty-five-in most cases, just the kind 
of jury sought by the prosecution."m MacDonald was uncomfortable 
J. Lightfoot, On a Level Playing Field, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 69, 73 (1996). 
Id. 
The accused's lawyer is the one person who stands between him and the 
cold reality, the full force and weight, of the system. The overriding respon-
sibility of the criminal defense attorney is to fight off the advances of those 
who would take advantage and to boldly assert and vigorously pursue the 
client's defenses. 
268. 456 U.S. I (1982). See generally JOE MCGINNISS, FATAL VISION (1983). 
269. See generally MCGINNISS, supra note 268. 
270. See MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 3-5; see also MCGINNISS, supra note 268, at 4-
6. 
271. MCGINNISS, supra note 268, at 484. "Although the term 'scientific jury 
selection' is used to describe the practices of jury consultants, the actual methods 
used vary considerably. There seem to be four types of jury consultants based on the 
prevailing scientific approach used: the Typologists, the Clinicians, the Empiricists, 
and the Theoreticians." Robert D. Minick, Using Jury Consultants to Assist Voir Dire, 
in LITIGATION 1994, at 289, 293-94 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook 
Series No. H4-5185, 1994). 
The Typologists argue that people can be categorized into various per-
sonality types that are meaningfully related to verdict preferences. . . . 
The Clinicians also rely on psychological principles and systems to rate 
individual jurors on their likely verdict preferences. . . . 
The Empiricists rely on statistical assumptions and methods to deter-
mine which kinds of people will hold a particular verdict preference. . . . 
The Theoreticians use psychological principles and empirical research 
methods to study each case. 
Id. at 294-96. 
272. MCGINNISS, supra note 268, at 485. The book describes the survey process as 
involving "a series of demographic questions pertaining to age, race, marital status, 
length of residence in the county, educational background, political affiliation, and 
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with the selection system from the beginning, explaining to his lawyer 
that "'everything you're saying goes against my gut feeling.",273 
In the midst of jury selection during the case, MacDonald felt that 
as each of the jurors were being selected, "'another nail [was] being 
hammered into [his] coffin. ",274 His lawyers and jury consultant were, 
however, "delighted with the makeup of the jury.'ms The jury found 
MacDonald guilty on all counts, despite the attorney's confidence in his 
jury selection strategy.276 
regularity of church attendance. . . . The professor had then weighted each of the 
factors, much as a horse player will do when analyzing a field of thoroughbreds." Id. 
at 484-85. 
273. Id. at 485 (quoting Jeffrey MacDonald). 
274. Id. at 496 (quoting Jeffrey MacDonald). 
275. Id. The promise of accurate scientific jury selection is in many ways the very 
opposite of the traditional jury selection strategy based on the instinct of lawyers and 
clients selecting jurors on often intangible feelings. Part of the validation of the tradi-
tional jury selection approach is that it fuses the attorney and client together with 
their jury selection choices. The jury's verdict, which is the result of their mutual 
judgment, is left squarely in the hands of the defendant and his lawyer. That is why 
giving due regard to the client's personal reactions to particular jurors is so impor-
tant. If the selection decisions are based on science, then science can be credited with 
the result rather than the emphasis being placed on the client who, after selecting the 
jury based on his own input, can truly be said to have had his day in court, even if 
hindsight reveals his decisions were wise or unwise. 
I would caution that the need for personal participation and validation should 
not be so easily substituted by science. The defendant's input is part of the intangible 
quality of freedom of choice which plays an important role in our system. It is that 
freedom to choose which novelist Aldous Huxley described as '''the right to live in 
constant apprehension of what may happen tomorrow.'" ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE 
NEW WORLD 163 (1946). Huxley's classic work "is a fable about a world ... where 
social stability is based on a scientific caste system. Human beings, graded from 
highest intellectuals to lowest manual workers." THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ENG-
LISH LITERATURE 127 (Margaret Drabble ed., 5th ed. 1985). Jury selection limited by 
the unproven promise of scientific accuracy has a potential dehumanizing effect on 
the criminal justice process, particularly for a criminal defendant who will be bound 
by the jury selection decisions in his case. 
276. See MCGINNISS, supra note 268, at 585. Indeed, it has been noted that: 
many commentators-both lawyers and social scientists-have expressed skep-
ticism regarding the ability of psychologist consultants to be of any real 
assistance in winning cases. Those skeptics from the legal community typical-
ly argue that trial preparation, including jury selection, is an art not a sci-
ence, and that the instincts of a seasoned trial lawyer are superior to any 
social scientific approach. 
Dennis P. Stolle et aI., The Perceived Fairness of the Pschologist Trial Consultant: 
An Empirical Investigation, 20 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 139, 143 (1996) (footnotes 
omitted). 
Winter, 1998] RESOLVING ETIllCAL TRAGEDIES 391 
It is obviously easy to criticize the attorney's jury selection decision 
in hindsight. But the point to be made here is not so much the correct-
ness of the jury selection strategy, but the importance of the client's 
input into the process. MacDonald had strong opinions about jury selec-
tion. That process is difficult enough without the added complications 
presented by Batson. 
The law as it currently stands blurs the lines between client and 
lawyer. Although the client may wish to express preferences for jurors 
based on race or gender, the law appears to prohibit the lawyer from 
acting on those preferences. Thus, the cl.ient, who has the most to lose 
from a poor result in the trial, places his lawyer in an awkward ethical 
position merely by expressing his own private racial or gender opinions. 
The client has no ethical obligation to refuse to consider such pref-
erences. The lawyer, however, is apparently forbidden to advance the 
client's biases. This may lead to the lawyer discouraging the client from 
giving his opinions on jury selection for fear of placing himself in an 
ethical dilemma.277 Discouraging the client's input may result in 
straining the client's confidence in the relationship with his attorney. 
The jurors may even notice the client's lack of involvement in the jury 
selection process, leaving them the impression that the client is not 
taking the matter seriously.278 The ethical tragedy is that the Batson 
doctrine may require that the lawyer's ethical obligation causes him to 
diminish the client's input into the part of the trial process that he IS 
most concerned about and for which he holds the strongest opinions. 
277. Lawyers have always been required to walk a fine line regarding the ethics of 
representing criminal defendants. On the one hand, it is clear that their loyalty re-
mains with the client. On the other, there always lurks the danger that the public 
perceives the attorney's role as shielding a guilty client from conviction. "No issue is 
more central to the American legal system and more controversial among the 
American public than the criminal defense lawyer's obligations in defending the 
guilty." DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ElHICS BY lHE PER-
VASIVE MErnOD 653 (1994). The tension between these obligations effects how the 
attorney makes decisions during a criminal trial. 
278. Jurors recognize the defendant's participation at trial during jury selection. 
One juror from the Bernhard Goetz trial observed: 
I had many opportunities to observe the man. . . . His face was expression-
less, betraying no emotion, and he displayed little if any reaction to anything 
that went on around him. . . . I got the feeling that his opinions about the 
prospective jurors were being put to use by his counsel. He wasn't just their 
pawn, along for the ride. 
MARK LESLY WIlH CHARLES SHUTILEWORlH, SUBWAY GUNMAN: A JUROR'S Ac-
COUNT OF lHE BERNHARD GOETZ TRIAL 15 (1988). 
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VI. ACT V: RESOLVING THE ETHICAL TRAGEDIES 
The challenge of resolving a problem as complicated as the one that 
the Batson doctrine has created involves a realistic appraisal of which 
circumstances can be corrected and which cannot. It should be remem-
bered that although Batson recognized a constitutional rule against dis-
crimination, its mechanisms are primarily procedural. 279 Thus, it may 
be that a procedural solution is the best place to solve some of the 
ethical tragedies this case has created.280 
The primary evil sought to be remedied by Batson was racial exclu-
sion of all black jurors from the trials of black defendants.281 I would 
propose a jury selection procedure that would permit a defendant more 
flexibility to actually choose jurors that he would desire to serve on his 
jury. I call this procedure "affirmative selection."282 This would be ac-
complished by permitting the defendant to trade some of his peremptory 
challenges to place qualified jurors,283 that he believes are favorable, 
to judge his case. The number of challenges traded to actually select 
jurors should never exceed one half of the total number of the jury 
panel.284 Once the defendant has made a decision to select a juror, the 
prosecutor will not be able to remove that juror with a peremptory 
challenge. Accordingly, it will be necessary for the defendant to make 
his affirmative selections from the jury panel at the beginning of jury 
selection.285 
279. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986). 
280. See id. at 97-99. The Court noted that the states are free to implement a "va-
riety of jury selection practices." ld. at 99 n.24. 
281. See id. at 87-90; see also supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
282. This phrase is not to be confused with affinnative action. It does not suggest 
an advantage for any particular party in the criminal case, rather, it contemplates that 
jurors be selected by preferred traits as opposed to being rejected for less preferred 
characteristics. By changing the focus and the jury selection tool, I believe we will 
be able to avoid a host of procedural problems that plague the peremptory challenge 
system. 
283. Since the jurors who will be available for selection will have already been 
established as eligible to serve because they will not have been excluded for "cause," 
there is little reason to be concerned that the jury selected from this process would 
not be as capable of deciding the case as one selected under the current peremptory 
challenge system. 
284. By providing that the defendant could not select more than one half the panel 
in this manner, it would assure that he would not dominate the jury selection process. 
285. I recognize that the selection process I propose would be greatly affected by 
the size of the prospective jury panel, the size of the community, or the nature or 
notoriety the case may have received. For example, a high profile capital case may 
require a larger panel of jurors to select from than a somewhat minor theft charge. I 
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The prosecution's recourse against the defendant's affirmative selec-
tion will be that it may select a juror from the panel that is to its lik-
ing. Although such a procedure might at first blush appear to simply 
. permit all parties to impose their offensive and discriminatory stereo-
types, it offers several advantages over the system currently in place. 
First, since the defendant triggers the process of actual affirmative 
selection of jurors, there would be no point for the prosecutor to at-
tempt to defeat the selection of jurors that might be of similar back-
ground to the defendant.286 For a black defendant who may desire to 
include blacks on his jury, this process offers the option to prevent the 
prosecutor from excluding black jurors.287 The same advantage would 
extend to defendants in communities with substantial minority popula-
tions other than African American.288 Once it is clear that total exclu-
sion will not be possible, a prosecutor would have little incentive to 
engage in such a practice. This adjustment to the jury selection process 
will have the advantage of resolving the primary evil Batson sought to 
address-total exclusion of blacks from a jury.289 
It does not make sense to create a doctrine that does not solve the 
primary concern for which it was created, while creating greater prob-
lems in its place. The awkward hearing into why jurors have been 
challenged offers little hope of actually increasing minority participation 
on criminal juries.290 Affirmative selection does offer the realistic pos-
sibility of increased minority participation in actual jury decision mak-
ing. 
Second, there is an advantage to permitting litigants to include ju-
rors that they believe are favorable, rather than rejecting those they find 
unacceptable. It is no facial equal protection violation for one juror to 
be selected by a lawyer who favors that juror's background or charac-
teristics over others.29 I If a prosecutor or defense lawyer engages in 
blatant exclusion of blacks or women with their peremptory challenges, 
the Batson mechanism, for what its worth, would still be available.292 
think these problems can be managed much more easily than the Batson problem that 
they will eliminate. 
286. See supra note 7. 
287. See id. 
288. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363-72 (1991). 
289. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87-90 (1986). 
290. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text. 
291. A preference in selecting a juror is different from an exclusion or rejection of 
a juror because, among other reasons, a juror has no right to serve on any particular 
jury. 
292. See supra note 206. Affirmative jury selection proposals have been advanced 
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However, affinnative selection eliminates the need for juror rejection to 
be the primary tool for empaneling favorable jurors by both the prose-
cution and defense. The defendant would be able to select who he be-
lieves to be his peers,293 while at the same time be able to eliminate 
jurors he believes to be highly undesirable.294 
This kind of flexibility protects the highly valued ability of the 
defendant to participate in jury selection,29S while at the same time 
penn its the prosecutor to respond to the defense's advocacy by an "af-
finnative selection" of his own. This give and take will achieve the bal-
ance that has been traditionally considered the advantage of the pre-
Batson system of unbridled peremptory challenges.296 
by other writers. One insightful proposal, by Professor Deborah A. Ramirez, suggests 
that under an ancient common law doctrine, litigants can be given a greater role in 
jury selection by a system that provides "each litigant with a certain number of affir-
mative peremptory choices, which litigants could use to include their 'peers' within 
the petit jury." Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of 
Trial by Jury De Medietate Linguae: A History and A Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. 
L. Rev. 777, 806 (1994). 
My proposal, while embracing several of the approaches and some of the rea-
soning of Professor Ramirez, differs in at least two substantial respects. First, the 
suggestion that my affinnative selection process be triggered only by the defendant 
and limited by his number of choices. Thus, if a defendant wishes to affinnatively 
select only one juror, he may do so being fully aware that the prosecution may only 
balance his selection with one selection of his own. This returns to the lawyer and 
client the coveted advocacy and control characteristic of the pre-Batson jury selection 
model. Second, Professor Ramirez would penn it some of her affirmatively selected 
jurors to be struck from the petit jury by the prosecutor or the defense. See id. at 
806-07. My proposal would not penn it either party to remove an affirmatively select-
ed juror. Such a procedure would highlight the importance of direct jury selection 
participation because each side would be linked to the consequences of their own 
strategic choices if the defendant chooses to trigger in the affinnative selection pro-
cess. 
293. See supra note 95. 
294. Several defense attorneys I interviewed for this Article were concerned that a 
system that afforded them the option to select one half of the jury and the prosecutor 
the right to select the other half would result in more hung juries if they could not 
exclude some of the highly undesirable jurors. In short, many believed that it was 
easier to detennine what jurors they did not like, than it was to select jurors who 
were favorably predisposed to their client's case. 
295. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
296. In support of the value of peremptory challenges, Professor Barbara Babcock 
has written: 
Common human experience, common sense, psychosociological studies, and 
public opinion polls tell us that it is likely that certain classes of people 
statistically have predisposition that would make them inappropriate jurors for 
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Third, the affinnative selection process removes many of the ethical 
dilemmas that are legion under the current system. It removes the po-
tential criminality of the use of jury consultants and the demographic 
infonnation on which they routinely rely.297 A lawyer operating in a 
preference based system would be free to consider infonnation he be-
lieves would assist him in shaping a favorable jury. There would be no 
need to ignore race or gender as part of the equation for exercising 
jury preference. 
Affinnative selection would reduce the need for lawyers to create 
adequate neutral reasons for rejecting a particular juror in order to reach 
one believed to be more favorable. This advantage assumes that a law-
yer will generally avoid dishonesty to the court if he has given an 
alternative. Certainly, a lawyer with a mind to discriminate may attempt 
to do so no matter what system is in place. But since it is nearly im-
possible for a judge to know whether a lawyer is being dishonest in a 
Batson hearing, removing the incentive to fabricate is a better way to 
ensure candor in the courtroom.298 
Fourth, for those defense lawyers who trigger the option of affinna-
tive selection, I would deem that any appeal on the basis of Batson 
would be waived.299 If the defendant believed that there was an 
underrepresentation of minorities in the jury pool itself, he could pre-
particular kinds of cases. . . . The peremptory, made without gIVIng any 
reason, avoids trafficking in the core of truth in most common stereotypes. 
Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. 
REv. 545, 553 (1975) (footnote omitted). 
297. See FREDERICK, supra note 15, §§ 3-202 to -203, at 47-65. 
298. This is not to say that one should never take action against prosecutors or 
defense lawyers who act in a blatantly racist manner against jurors. The jurors may 
still take legal action for their exclusion from the jury. See supra note 143 and ac-
companying text. The lawyer is also bound by his oath of office to operate in accord 
with his ethical responsibility not to discriminate in excluding jurors, and prosecutors 
have a special responsibility to the community at large to perform their duties in 
light of special ethical standards as a representative of the people. See, e.g., Berger v. 
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Thus, the prosecutor should be very careful to avoid 
discriminatory conduct. 
299. This proposal would reduce the clutter in the appellate court resolving such 
issues. Again, the defendant would have to decide, with the help of his lawyer, 
which weapons he would choose to pursue his case. 
Almost immediately after Batson was decided, appeals under the case flour-
ished. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Batson and the Straight-Faced Test, A.B.A. 1., 
Aug. 1992, at 82, 82. By 1990, there had been more than 700 state and federal cases 
reported on the subject. See id. My proposal would eliminate a large number of these 
cases. 
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serve that objection on appeaVoo but if he elected to affinnatively se-
lect a portion of his jury, this would be presumed to be an unappeal-
able strategic choice.301 If the defense lawyer wishes to take his 
chances with a Batson hearing and appeal that issue, he would simply 
refuse to trigger affinnative selection. 
Affinnative selection would be a better method than to abolish pe-
remptory challenges, as has been suggested by many scholars.302 Pro-
ponents of abolition argue that discrimination against blacks and women 
should not be tolerated in jury selection.301 Abolition of the challenge 
will not necessarily result in a more inclusive jury.104 
Refonn of the jury selection system alone will not be enough to 
address the concerns that have been recently generated by the jury 
refonn debate.305 Adjustments to the system that will inform lawyers 
about the jurors, make jury pools more inclusive, and educate jurors 
about their job will also supplement the effectiveness of my proposed 
jury selection system. 
During the voir dire process, the lawyers should be permitted to ask 
jurors more questions about their backgrounds and experiences so that 
jurors may be selected based on infonnation beyond the lawyer's obser-
vations of their physical characteristics.306 Heavy reliance on physical 
observation of jurors without an opportunity to gather more relevant 
infonnation encourages lawyers to engage in unfair stereotyping for 
300. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359-60 (1970) (invalidating a jury list 
based on the "substantial disparity between the percentages of Negro residents in the 
county as a whole and of Negroes on the newly constituted jury list"). 
30 I. Appellate courts already do this when lawyers fail to use all their strikes 
when at trial appealing challenges for cause. 
302. See supra note 72 and accompanying text 
303. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
304. Eliminating peremptory challenges will not necessarily mean that more minori-
ties will serve on juries. It is still required that steps be taken to increase the number 
of minorities in the jury pool. 
305. The jury reform debate is not a new idea in the United States. Efforts to 
improve the jury system have existed even in the early 1940s. Complaints about the 
system's shortcomings like the length of time for jury service, the qualifications of 
citizen jurors, and the effects of press coverage were all concerns of reformers before 
the onset of the electronic age. See LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 412 (I 947}. 
306. The Supreme Court has held that the scope of voir dire is governed by the 
discretion of the trial court subject to violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526-27 (1973). 
It has also been recognized that voir dire examination also assists counsel in exercis-
ing peremptory challenges. See Mu'min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (\99\). 
Winter, 1998] RESOLVING ETHICAL TRAGEDIES 397 
want of an alternative.301 
I also believe that jurors should receive more education about their 
role in the process. lOS To advance this goal, I would propose a system 
where jurors would receive one day of mandatory juror education prior 
to their being selected to serve. The particulars of the content of such 
juror training could be determined by panels composed of prosecutors, 
judges, and defense lawyers working together with local bar associa-
tions.J09 
This training would create better informed decision makers and 
reduce the possibility that a jury trial verdict would merely be the re-
sult of jury selection science,JIO clever advocacy/II or racial jury 
nullification:Jl2 This training component would provide the needed bal-
ance so that everyone in the system could do their job as they see fit. 
Lawyers could retain their role as advocates, judges could remain mod-
erators, and jurors, fully informed of their role, could thoughtfully de-
cide the cases. Educating the jury about its proper role and, indeed, the 
role of all participants in the process, will remove much of the mystery 
from the jury trial for the jurors and reduce the risk that they will 
decide the case based on assumptions that they have formed from infor-
mation they may have received about the workings of a jury from the 
popular media.J1J 
307. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
308. Today, most jurors receive only a brief orientation prior to serving on a jury. 
The primary guidance that will be given is generally withheld until they are given 
instructions by the judge at the end of a case. 
309. The attorneys and judges could· receive credit toward any state continuing 
legal education requirement they may be obligated to satisfy. 
310. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text. 
311. See supra note 248. 
312. See supra notes 233, 239-42 and accompanying text. 
313. Any jury training program should include a discussion of the role of the 
defense lawyer and prosecutor; a discussion of the judge's role and the events that 
take place routinely during a trial, like bench conferences and information on why 
they cannot talk to outsiders or each other prior to their deliberations. There is no 
reason jurors should not know what role these frequent events play in a trial. The 
risk that they will speculate on such matters or attach improper significance to them 
is far too great, particularly in light of the fact that most courtroom rules and proce-
dures have some basis in logic. 
As one commentator has noted: 
Our legal system's single-minded devotion to a somewhat mechanistic 
notion of "fairness" has led us to keep from the jury important information 
that we fear might have an improper effect on the verdict. This practice re-
flects the condescension with which courts often treat jurors: we make them 
wait while the lawyers and judge wrangle; we keep them in the dark about 
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This concept of juror education could easily fit into the "one 
day/one trial" system currently in place in many jurisdictions.314 Such 
systems could be modified into "two days/one trial" in order to accom-
modate the proposed training component. Before we consider radical re-
forms like abandoning the jury system for a different method of trying 
cases,3J5 we should at least attempt to educate jurors better to deter-
mine if that improvement will resolve our lack of confidence in the 
process. 
Finally, I believe that we should take serious steps to make jury 
pools more inclusive of all groups of citizens.316 Expanding the pool 
of available jurors is a desirable goal in our society and well worth the 
effort it may require. 317 Some reformers have embraced policies to ex-
much of the proceedings. 
William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575, 586 (1991) (footnote 
omitted). 
314. G. Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State Jury Reform Efforts, 79 
JUDICATURE 216, 217 (Mar.lApr. 1996) (footnote omitted). The so called "one 
day/one trial" system is currently in place in about one-third of the United States. Id. 
(footnote omitted). One Michigan county experiment with "one day/one trial" juries 
showed that they include more executives, professionals and others of an increased 
educational level. See Deve/~pments in the Law-The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REv. 
1408, 1455-56 (1997). "Combined with the elimination of professional exemptions, 
one day/one trial could greatly increase courts' chances of obtaining more inclusive 
jury pools." Id. at 1456. 
315. In Germany, for example, juries have been abandoned altogether. See Markus 
Dirk Dubber, The German Jury and the Metaphysical Volk: From Romantic Idealism 
to Nazi Ideology, 43 AM. J. COMPo L. 227, 228 (1995). They have been replaced by 
a mixed system where "lay participants .... sit on panels with professional judges." 
Id. See generally John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Conti-
nental Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 195 (dis-
cussing strengths and weaknesses of a mixed jury system). 
316. Inclusiveness of all groups of citizens in the jury system has been a problem. 
Aggressive efforts should be made to improve minority participation. "Getting minori-
ties involved in the jury process has been a struggle . . . . The reasons are that 
voter rolls don't always reflect minority participation and some minority communities 
tend to be more transient." Mark Curriden, Jury Reform: No One Agrees on Whether 
the System is Broken. But Everyone is Trying to Change It, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 
72, 73. Expanding minority participation will do as much for the integrity of the jury 
process as any strategy for assuring minorities are not improperly struck from a jury 
panel. 
317. At common law, the respect afforded to jurors was far greater than they re-
ceive today. An early criminal law treatise has noted "if anyone strike a juryman in 
the presence of the courts at Westminster, or the justices of assize, or of oyer and 
terminer, he will lose his hand, forfeit his goods, and the profits of his land during 
his life." 1 JOSEPH CHITIY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON mE CRIMINAL LAW 526 
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pand from the practice of using the voting rolls to using motor vehicle 
registration to draw eligible jurors.JIB I agree with such an approach, 
but I believe more is required. I propose that every person seeking a 
driver's license be required to attend mandatory citizenship training on 
the role and function of the jury before being issued the privilege of a 
driver's Iicense.319 Such training should also be required during 
driver's license renewal so that more citizens may be reminded of their 
important obligation to serve on a jury.320 
This process will particularly instill the value of the jury in the 
nation's youth. There are few items more prized among young people 
than a driver's license.321 By combining the privilege to drive with the 
privilege and responsibility to serve on a jury, we will do more than 
simply pay lip service to this important civic obligation. Less tolerance 
for avoiding jury service322 and more respect for the role of the jury 
should be welcome by-products of such reforms.323 
(1832). 
318. By 1991, only Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, and Oklahoma used motor vehicle 
registration lists as the primary source for obtaining jurors. See Robert L. Harris, Jr., 
Note, Redefining the Harm of Peremptory Challenges, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
1027, 1057 n.173 (1991) (collecting the various sources of selecting jurors among the 
several states). 
319. It may be that a few exceptions to this requirement may be necessary, but 
such exceptions should be deemed highly necessary. 
320. Once the driver has received the training, they could be certified for such 
completion and need not receive it again until they would actually be called to serve 
under the "two day/one trial" system I have already discussed. See supra notes 307-
16 and accompanying text. 
321. Perhaps the use of the privilege to drive as an opportunity to educate citizens 
about the responsibility to serve on a jury will promote greater respect for the courts 
in general. Most citizens come into contact with the court system for the first time 
on traffic matters. It makes sense to link jury service and driving privilege for this 
reason alone. 
322. I agree with the assessment of Stephen Adler that "[b]uilding a better jury 
means treating jury duty like military service in wartime; the requirement of service 
should be, for the most part, nonnegotiable." STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL 
AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM 220 (1994). He notes that only "[a]bout 
45 percent of Americans who are sent jury notices actually appear at the courthouse." 
Id. at 243 n.1. 
323. Many people do not take their jury service obligation seriously. Noted trial 
attorney F. Lee Bailey once remarked that many people do not respect the obligation 
to serve on a jury. See F. LEE BAILEY WITII HARVEY ARONSON, THE DEFENSE NEV-
ER REsTS 257 (1971). "Most people put jury duty in a class with measles and root 
canal work. Quite often, intelligent, successful people who would make good jurors 
are the ones who get out of serving." Id. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The jury has received severe criticism in recent years,324 particular-
ly regarding how its members are chosen.325 The Supreme Court, at-
tempting to solve the problem of blatant racial discrimination,326 creat-
ed a set of rules it believed would solve some of the problems, but has 
created others in its place. By rethinking the way juries are selected, 
much of the dishonesty and confusion that ten years of well inten-
tioned, but unworkable rules have created, can be avoided.327 
By combining the technique of "affirmative selection,'>32S with re-
forms in jury voir dire,329 jury education,330 and by the expansion of 
the jury pool, we can achieve the goals of a more effective and ethical 
jury system.331 The integrity of the profession requires that we replace 
the "catch me if you can"m system that has resulted from Batson and 
its progeny. 333 
324. One trial court judge expressed his concerns that "Oluries may be getting 
dumber." HAROLD J. ROTIlWAX, GUILTY, THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 201 
(1996). 
325. See supra note 255. 
326. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text. 
327. See supra Parts II-V. 
328. See supra Part VI. 
329. See id. 
330. See id. 
331. See supra note 17. 
332. See supra Part III. 
333. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. 
